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IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT: THE SUPREME
COURT'S UNNECESSARY DEPARTURE FROM
PRECEDENT IN KYLLO v. UNITED STATES.
INTRODUCTION
At 8:45 a.m. (EDT) on September 11, 2001, a hijacked passenger
jet, American Airlines Flight 111 crashed into the North Tower of the
World Trade Center in New York City.2 Watching from our televi-
sions and listening to our radios, Americans united in similar thoughts
and questions. Was this an accident? Failure of the air traffic control?
A pilot error? How could this have happened? A stunned nation
could do nothing but watch as eighteen minutes later a second hi-
jacked aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, 3 slammed into the South
Tower of the World Trade Center.4 One commercial jetliner crashing
accidentally into one of the world's tallest buildings seemed margin-
ally feasible-but when a second airplane hit, it started to become
clear that this was no accident. As the buildings blazed and rescue
workers tried courageously to reach those trapped in the injured tow-
ers, desperate employees in the two buildings jumped some seventy
stories or more to their deaths. 5
At 9:30 a.m., President George W. Bush, speaking from Sarasota,
Florida, announced that the nation had been struck by an "apparent
terrorist attack."' 6 Any remaining doubt about whether this was an act
of terrorism was dispelled when not thirteen minutes after the Presi-
dent's announcement, American Airlines Flight 777 crashed into the
Pentagon.8 At 10:10 a.m., the nightmare continued when a fourth hi-
1. Flight 11 was out of Boston, Massachusetts. September 1l: Chronology of Terror, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul
Law Review).
2. The First Attack. AM. AT WAR. Issue 02. 2001. at 6.
3. Flight 175 was also out of Boston. Massachusetts. September 11: Chronology of Terror,
supra note 1.
4. The First Attack, supra note 2, at 7.
5. Id.
6. September 11: Chronology of Terror. supra note 1.
7. Flight 77 was out of Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., and was destined for
Los Angeles. American Airlines Tragedy: The Official Statement, AM. Al WAR, Issue 02, 2001.
at 10.
8. September 11: Chronology of Terror. supra note 1.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
jacked plane, United Airlines Flight 93,9 crashed in Somerset County,
Pennsylvania.t °
A nation strangled by fear, devastation, and uncertainty mourned as
later that morning on September 11, both World Trade Towers col-
lapsed into an unimaginable heap of dust, debris, metal, and horrifi-
cally, human life.a" Among those lost were over seventy-eight police
officers and roughly two hundred New York firefighters who, upon
response to the scene, raced courageously into the burning buildings.1 2
Hundreds of airline passengers were sacrificed when their airplanes
became virtual bombs. 13 Thousands of Pentagon workers and tenants
of the World Trade Center have never been found. It is safe to say,
after such an unprecedented attack on our homeland, this nation will
never be the same again.
As the shock of the attacks lessened in the days immediately follow-
ing September 11 and the information started to become available,
our questions changed from wondering, "Why?" to instead asking,
"Who?"' 14 Well-founded suspicions have turned on the involvement
of former Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden, t5 who had allegedly
been planning attacks on the United States from a military training
9. Flight 93 departed from Newark Airport at 8:01 am and was destined for San Francisco.
United Airlines Addresses the Tragedy: The Official Statements Confirm the Horrible Truth,
AMERICA AT WAR, Issue 02, 2001, at 24.
10. September 11: Chronology of Terror. supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Terror Attacks Hit U.S., at http://222.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11 /worldtrade.crash (last visited
June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
14. Hijackers Identified: Swift Investigation Tracks Down Identities of Terrorists. AM. Ar WAR,
Issue 02. 2001, at 58.
15. Frontline: A Biography of Osama bin Laden, at www.pbs.org./wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/binladen/who/bio.html (last visited June 2. 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review). Born
in 1957, bin Laden is the son of a construction mogul in the Saudi Kingdom. Id. Bin Laden was
raised by a very dominating and disciplined father who died when bin Laden was 13 years old.
Id. Bin Laden is highly educated, having graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 1981.
Id.
At an early age, bin Laden began forming an Islamic responsibility and lobbied "with his
brothers, relatives, and friends at school to support the mujahedeen," a religious organization.
Id. In 1982, he decided to go to Afghanistan, and began to support military training camps in the
defense of the mujahedeen. In 1986, bin Laden founded at least six of his own camps and fought
against the Soviet army. Id. He spent about eight months of the year in Afghanistan, as op-
posed to his homeland. Saudi Arabia. Frontline: A Biography of Osama Bin Laden. supra.
Feeling that his organization was not properly structured, in 1988 Osama bin Laden called his
complex "Al-Oa'edah," which is Arabic for "The Base." and arranged for proper documenta-
tion, which tracked the records of all visitors. Id. This is the base that has largely been responsi-
ble for the training and dissemination of anti-American warriors and literature. Id.
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base in Afghanistan. 16 The ruthless terrorists, whom he creates, will
stop at nothing to wage Jihad, or Holy War, on the United States.
There is a new enemy, perhaps the most ruthless one we, as a na-
tion, [have] ever faced ... the invisible foe ... the terrorist! We do
not know who they are or where they are. They do not follow any
rules of engagement, have no regard for human life, even their own.
They will kill or slaughter women and children and use them as
pawns in their holy wars and crusade.17
In the face of an event so horrific and uncontrollable, how will Ameri-
can intelligence ensure that something comparable or worse does not
happen again? It appears as if conventional methods of surveillance
will no longer suffice; "[t]he fact is that there is a level of sophistica-
tion and coordination no counter-terrorism experts had ever previ-
ously anticipated."' 18
The Fourth Amendment, however, protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 19 When will the search for terrorists become
unreasonable? Recently, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to
prevent an improper search and seizure when it decided Kyllo v.
United States.20 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, laid
down a hard-line rule: So long as the technology being employed to
perform a search of one's home is not within the "general public use,"
the surveillance is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and is presumptively unreasonable when unaccompanied by a
warrant. 21  In the aftermath of September 11, this appears to be a
problematic holding for two main reasons: (1) terrorists are simply not
using conventional methods of communication, and therefore, tradi-
tional methods of surveillance will not be enough to ensure this sort of
attack cannot be replicated; 22 and (2) these terrorists are on American
soil, right in our own backyard. 23 It seems obvious then, in order to
stop these terrorists from killing even more innocent civilians, intelli-
gence is undoubtedly going to have to turn to technology that may not
16. Id.
17. Freedom Shaken, But Remains Solid: 9/11/01 Will Live in Infamy, AM. AT WAR, Issue 02,
2001. at 46.
18. The Pearl Harbor of Terrorism, AM. AT WAR, Issue 02, 2001, at 19 (quoting Anthony
Cardesman, a terrorism expert for the Center of Strategic and International Studies).
19. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
20. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
21. Id. at 2046.
22. The Pearl Harbor of Terrorism, supra note 18 (quoting Anthony Cardesman).
23. Hijackers Identified: Swift Investigation Tracks Down Identities of Terrorists supra note
14. at 58-59 (stating that the investigation for terrorists has taken authorities to Florida, Boston,
Rhode Island. Maine. Massachusetts. as well as New York and Washington D.C.). Additionally.
each of the four crashed jetliners are believed to have been flown by hijackers trained as pilots in
the United States. according to Attorney General John Aschcroft.
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be in the "general public use."' 24 In the wake of this devastating as-
sault, when the safety of the United States is more volatile than it has
arguably ever been, is the Supreme Court going to deny the U.S. gov-
ernment the right to perform the necessary terrorist surveillance and
searches just because it lacks a warrant? It is highly unlikely. Realis-
tically, the Court will probably bend over backwards to allow U.S.
intelligence to take whatever measures are necessary in order to en-
sure that more American lives are not lost in vain.
When speaking of Fourth Amendment rights, it is generally hard to
draw the line where issues of national security are at odds with per-
sonal liberty. However, the Supreme Court, with its holding in Kyllo,
has set itself up for criticism. Not only has it created an all-encom-
passing rule regarding the use of technology, 25 which will undoubtedly
be undermined in the course of terrorist-hunting, but the holding from
this case is also a vast departure from Fourth Amendment precedent.
This Note explores the issue in detail.
Because Kyllo v. United States involved a young man who used high
intensity lamps to grow marijuana in his home, Part II of this Note will
begin by providing an overview of drug use and marijuana in the
United States. 26 This Note will explain how halide lights are used in
indoor marijuana growth and the relevancy of thermal imaging to the
crackdown on drug manufactures. 27 A brief background on the
Fourth Amendment and relevant search and seizure rules regarding
the home is also appropriate and necessary, and is included in the
background section. 28 In greater detail, this Note will describe the
facts and holdings from four pertinent cases,29 which are significant as
precedent for the decision in Kyllo, which is discussed at length in Part
111.30 Part IV will make comparisons between these cases and the
Kyllo decision to show how the reasoning employed by the majority of
the Kyllo Court was a faulty departure from pertinent precedent by
which the Court is bound.31 Finally, in Part V of this Note, the con-
cerns for the future of search and seizure law in the aftermath of the
Kyllo decision will be addressed.32
24. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
29. The cases that will be discussed are: Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): Smith v.
Maryland. 442 U.S. 735 (1979): Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S. 445 (1988): and United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983). See infra notes 81-195 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 196-238 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 239-340 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 341-365 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52:201
2002] IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT
II. BACKGROUND
This section will provide background information on drug use in the
United States. It also explains how halide lights enable indoor mari-
juana growth, as well as how police authorities are using thermal
imaging devices to regulate this new type of greenhousing. A brief
discussion of pertinent Fourth Amendment search and seizure law is
necessary for understanding the legal environment from which Kyllo
was cultivated. Finally, there are four Fourth Amendment cases from
which comparisons with Kyllo will ultimately be drawn in the Analysis
section.
A. Overview of Drug Use in the United States
Although there are a number of illicit drugs available to those who
so desire, 33 the most commonly used drug in the United States is mari-
juana.34 These drugs are increasingly pervasive in American life.
They cut across every gender, race, and socioeconomic level. 35 In
1999, it was estimated that roughly 14.8 million Americans were cur-
rent users of illicit drugs. 36 Of teens between the ages of twelve and
seventeen, more than one in ten used illegal drugs in 1995. 37 Al-
though this was a decrease since the 1970s, it was up almost 50% since
33. Commonly abused drugs include, but are not limited to: hashish, barbiturates,
bezodiazepines, rohypnol, Quaaludes. ketamine, angel dust. LSD, mushrooms, codeine, heroine,
morphine, opium, amphetamines, cocaine, methamphetamine, anabolic steroids, and inhalants.
National Institute On Drug Abuse, Commonly Abused Drugs, at http://www.nida.nih.gov/Drug-
sofAbuse.html (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
34. Drug Enforcement Administration. Marijuana, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/mari-
juana.html (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review). Marijuana refers to the
leaves and flowering tops of the cannabis plants. Id. This drug can be consumed in one of two
fashions: inhaling or ingesting it. Id. Marijuana comes in varying degrees of potency, depending
on the breeding of the particular plant that is used to produce it. Id. Two derivative substances
of the cannabis plant, sinsemilla and hashish, are particularly popular with habitual marijuana
users. Id. This is because both substances have an extremely high concentration of delta-9-
tetrahvocannabinol. or THC, the active chemical in marijuana. Id. A greater concentration of
THC in marijuana creates an intensified high for the user. The average THC content of cannabis
products has risen over ten percentage points in the past several decades. Drug Enforcement
Administration, Marijuana. supra.
Smoking or swallowing marijuana will generate a psychoactive effect on almost all users. It
manifests itself by causing "euphoria, slowed thinking, and reaction time, confusion, impaired
balance and coordination/cough, frequent respiratory infections: impaired memory and learning
[as well as] increased heart rate, anxiety: panic attacks: tolerance [and] addiction." National
Institute on Drug Abuse. Commonly Used Drugs, supra note 33.
35. See generally Drug Enforcement Administration. Drug Use in the United States. at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/overview.htm (last visited June 2. 2002) (on file with DePaul Law
Review).
36. National Institute on Drug Abuse. Commonly Abused Drugs, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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1992.38 Of youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, over
17% reported consuming illicit drugs in 1999. 39 Five point one per-
cent of the population ages twelve and older were monthly marijuana
users in 1999.40 Marijuana was also the drug of choice for 87% of
teenagers entering drug rehabilitation programs in 1999 in New York
City.41 In 1999, almost 50% of high school seniors said they had used
marijuana at least once in their lives, which was an increase since
1992.42
In Chicago in 1999, 44.6% of adult males tested positive for mari-
juana consumption at the time of arrest.43 A shocking 74.4% of adult
males who were arrested had positive traces of an illicit drug in their
bloodstream, not exclusively marijuana. 44 Logically speaking, it is ap-
parent that there is a direct and significant correlation between drug
abuse and crime in the United States.
Therefore, the United States is waging an ongoing battle in the war
on drugs with the guidance of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). In 2000, the DEA employed 9132 employees, 4561 of which
were special agents actually investigating and taking down drug perpe-
trators and users.45 The DEA spent approximately $1.55 billion in an
effort to combat drug abuse and trafficking in 2000 alone.46 However,
the investment is paying off; since 1986 the DEA has seized 1,084,653
kilograms of marijuana during highway interdiction seizures. 47 In that
time, it has also intercepted other drugs worth an estimated street
value of $592 million. 48 In 1999 alone, the DEA made 328,490 domes-
tic arrests for drug violation charges. 49
38. The rate was highest in 1979 at 16.3%, declined to 5.3% in 1992, then increased to 10.9%
in 1995. Id.
39. Drug Enforcement Administration, Marijuana, supra note 34.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. In 1992. 32.6% of high school seniors reported using marijuana at least once in their
lives. Id.
43. Drug Enforcement Administration, Percentage of Adult Males Testing Positive for Specific
Drugs at Time of Arrest in 1999, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/drugstats/htm (last visited June
2. 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
44. Id.
45. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Law Enforcement Statistics, DEA Staffing and
Appropriations, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/lawstats.htm (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file
with DePaul Law Review).
46. Id.
47. Drug Enforcement Administration, Operation Pipeline/Convoy Highway Interdiction
Seizures, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/drugstats/htm (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with
DePaul Law Review).
48. Id.
49. Drug Enforcement Administration: DEA Arrests, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/drug-
stats/htm (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
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Because of the increase in the prevalence of marijuana, the DEA
has created the Domestic Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Pro-
gram (DCE/SP), 50 which focuses exclusively on the elimination of ma-
rijuana.51 Thirteen million dollars of the $1.55 billion DEA budget is
allocated to DCE/SP.52 In 1999 alone, the program was credited with
the elimination of 3,413,083 outdoor marijuana plants and 208,027 in-
door plants.53 The Program also made 11,922 marijuana related ar-
rests and seized almost $30 million in assets. 54
B. High Intensity Discharge Lamps and the Indoor Growth
of Marijuana
With the advent of the DCE/SP and the pressure on the DEA to
crack down on marijuana growth, trafficking, and consumption, many
producers of the plant have relegated their business to indoor growing
factories.55 These marijuana horticulturists use sophisticated indoor
growing techniques such as high intensity halide lights, 56 computerized
50. Drug Enforcement Administration: Marijuana Eradication, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
programs/marijuana/htm (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review). Because
marijuana is the most widely used and available drug in the United States, the DEA took an
initiative to help eradicate marijuana with the introduction of a new program. Id. The DCE/SP
was created by the DEA in 1979 and is the only nationwide program that exclusively addresses
marijuana use and eradication. Id. DCE/SP began in Hawaii and California, but by 1985 it had
reached the rest of the fifty states as well. Id. Success of the DCE/SP program has been attrib-
uted to the ability of participating agencies to share their information, technology, and field
agents. Id. The DCE/SP has been triumphant in preventing the dissemination of domestically
grown marijuana. Id.
51. Drug Enforcement Administration: Marijuana Eradication, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. $26,911,262 worth of marijuana was seized. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gardener's Supply Company, Growing Under Lights; Grow Plants Even When the Sun
Doesn't Shine, at http://www.gardeners.com/gardening/BGBunderlightsc.asp (last visited June
2. 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review). High Intensity Discharge Lamps, or HID's, are
utilized largely by indoor commercial gardeners and intense horticulturists. These ultra-high
wattage lights are extremely bright and efficient. There are four categories of HID lamps: high
pressure sodium, metal halide, low pressure sodium, and mercury vapor. Id. A four hundred-
watt high pressure sodium or metal halide bulb can illuminate a growing area of up to twenty-
five square feet. Homegrown Hydroponics, Lighting Systems: Use and Identification, at http://
www.hydroponics.com/c-light.html (last visited June 2, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
A one thousand-watt bulb of either variety is powerful enough to effectively provide artificial
sunlight to a garden of roughly forty-nine square feet. Id. HID's "generally emit twice the
amount of light (lumes) as an incandescent or fluorescent bulb." Gardner's Supply Company,
Growing Under Lights; Grow Plants Even When the Sun Doesn't Shine, supra. These lights are
so powerful they are often used to illuminate such areas as malls, sports fields, ballparks, and
streets. Id.
Metal halide lights emit a bluish-white light, which is premium for growing plants. Home-
grown Hydroponics, Lighting Systems: Use and Identification, supra. These lamps provide a
spectrum of light, much like sunlight. Id. It helps to keep the leaves green, healthy, and vibrant:
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irrigation, and hydroponics cultivation to make their plants vibrant,
healthy, strong, and productive. 57 Additionally, special fertilizers,
plant hormones, steroids, insecticides, and genetic engineering all
work to increase the rates of marijuana foliage and growth.58 The
stringently controlled indoor growing environment is conducive to the
growth of marijuana at the highest potencies. 59 Without the harsh ele-
ments of mother nature to interfere, the plants can be cultivated year-
round, even in someone's home or garage. 60
C. Thermal Imaging and the Detection of Indoor
Marijuana Growth
A thermal imager is a scanning device that identifies the heat emit-
ted by an object into the surrounding air. 61 From these infrared ema-
nations, a virtual black and white photograph of the relative levels of
heat in a given area is created by the scanner. 62 The more heat an
object or an area emanates, the lighter or whiter the object or area
will appear on the scan. 63 An object that appears darker on the scan,
(typically, varying shades of gray or even black) is presumed to be
relatively cool in comparison to its environment. 64 The imager is a
non-intrusive device that records tepidity; it does not trespass into the
home with lasers, beams, or rays.65 The device "operates somewhat
like a video camera showing heat images."' 66 The thermal imaging de-
vice does not have the capacity to show people or activity within a
building-only the heat being emitted therefrom. 67
under these lights the plants grow to be stocky and strong. Id. Serious indoor gardeners favor
metal halide lamps over all other kinds of growing lamps. Id.
57. Drug Enforcement Administration. Marijuana, supra note 34.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Indoor plants range from several plants grown in a closet, to thousands of plants
grown in elaborate, specially constructed greenhouses. Id.
61. Kyllo v. United States. 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001).
62. Jeffrey P. Campisi, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies; The Constitutionality of
Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REV. 241, 244 (2001) (stating that "the imager then converts the
heat into a color image, usually in the form of a black and white two-dimensional picture.").
63. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041 (stating that "the imager converts radiation into images based on
relative warmth-black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences.").
64. Id.
65. Kathleen A. Lomas, Bad Physics and Bad Law: A Review of the Constitutionality of Ther-
mal Imagery Surveillance after United States v. Elkins, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 799. 800 (2000) (stating
that '[a] thermal imager passively records thermal emissions, acting much like a camera, rather
than emitting intrusive beams or rays.").
66. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
67. Id. at 2048.
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For many years, this technology has been utilized by the military,
but increasingly, law enforcement agencies are making use of the ther-
mal imaging device to "supplement the probable cause necessary to
obtain a search warrant and contribute to the discovery and eradica-
tion of indoor operations. '' 68 Ideally, if the device detects "hot spots"
in the home of an individual, this will give credence to already existing
suspicions that an indoor growing operation is actually underway be-
hind closed doors.69 With the thermal imaging device to bolster prob-
able cause, more frequently the law enforcement agents are able to
obtain warrants to search for drugs and other contraband in suspicious
homes. 70
D. The Fourth Amendment and Searches of the Home
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 71
In layman's terms, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, and it also requires that probable cause exist
before a search warrant is issued.72 The Fourth Amendment applies
only to government searches and seizures; private parties are
"shielded from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. ' 73
"At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasona-
ble governmental intrusion. '74 There is a firm line at the entrance to
the home environment and without extenuating circumstances this
line cannot be crossed without a warrant. 75 Any physical invasion of
68. Lomas. supra note 65. at 800 (citing Mindy G. Wilson. The Prewarrant Use of Thermal
Imagery: Has this Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of
Fourth Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. L.J. 891, 893 (1994)).
69. Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure. 3 FED PRAC. & PROC. CRiM 2d 663
(R.41) (2001).
70. See, e.g., Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2041. A Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant that au-
thorized a search of Danny Lee Kyllo's home based on tips from informants, electric bills, and,
most importantly, a thermal imaging scan that revealed high concentrations of heat over the
garage of Kyllo's house. Id. This search revealed over 100 marijuana plants. Id. For more
information on the facts of Kyllo, see infra notes 196-238 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. Kevin J. Allen. Overview of the Fourth Amendment. 88 GEO. L.J. 883 (2000).
73. Id. at 884.
74. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2041 (citing Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
75. Lomas. supra note 65, at 804 (citing United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247. 1258 n.15
(10th Cir. 1996) (McKay. J.. dissenting) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573. 590 (1980)).
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the home, "by even a fraction of an inch," is too much.76 Therefore,
this means before an officer can penetrate the home environment, he
must obtain special permission from a magistrate. However, the
"Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended
to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing
by a home on public thoroughfares. '77 An officer, just because he is
in the area of the home, should not have to avert his eyes from seeing
something that may be construed as private. "What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ' 78 Therefore, if an officer
can see something from a thoroughfare that is readily accessible to the
public at large, there will be no violation of privacy because there was
no expectation of privacy in the first place. The "mere fact that an
individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his [or her]
activities" does not preclude an officer's observations of clearly visible
activities from a public vantage point where he has a right to be. 79
Even if an individual goes to great pains to prevent an officer from
finding out about clandestine and perhaps illegal activity, if the officer
can find evidence of that activity from a public place, there will be no
violation of privacy. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. This involves inquiries into: (1) whether the individ-
ual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search; and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. 80
E. A Discussion of Relevant Fourth Amendment Precedent
Regarding Search and Seizure in and Around the Home
Although there are many cases involving search and seizure 8' that
extend outside the immediate area of the home, Kyllo involves a home
search, and thus the cases below, which primarily address just this sort
of activity, are most relevant to an analysis of Kyllo's departure from
precedent.
76. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
77. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207. 213 (1986).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 216.
80. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. Id.
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1. Katz v. United States82
Arriving before the Supreme Court in 1967, Katz v. United States is
often considered the landmark case for search and seizure authority.83
Petitioner Katz was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1084, having been
charged with eight counts of transmitting wagering information by
telephone across state lines.84 His conviction rested largely on evi-
dence put forth by FBI agents who, unbeknownst to Katz, attached a
listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth
from which Katz was placing his calls.85 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and rejected Katz's argument
that the eavesdropping had occurred in violation of his Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure.8 6
The Supreme Court was called upon to address the Fourth Amend-
ment implications in the case.87
The majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, held that
the legitimacy of a search and seizure should not be defined by the
locale in which the search or seizure takes place. 8  Instead, "[t]he
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."8 9 This means that
even in an area, which is both accessible and exposed to the public, if
there are nonetheless bona fide privacy expectations, the Fourth
Amendment will protect those expectations from violation. 90 When
Katz stepped into that phone booth and shut the door behind himself,
he was trying to eliminate "the uninvited ear." 91 To this privacy he
was entitled, and Katz did not forfeit this right to privacy by placing
his phone calls from a place where he could be readily observed. 92
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. Id. at 348.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 348-49. The court of appeals reasoned that without a physical penetration of the
area occupied by Katz, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. Id.
87. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349. The Supreme Court considered "whether a public telephone booth
is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening
recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the
user of the booth." Id.
88. Id. at 350 (stating that "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not neces-
sarily promoted by incantation of the phrase constitutionally protected area.").
89. Id. at 351.
90. Id. (stating that "but what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessi-
ble to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
91. Id. at 352.
92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (stating that "[o]ne who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.").
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Justice John Harlan, in a concurring opinion, summarized the main
holdings of Katz. Katz stands for the proposition that where a consti-
tutionally protected area is invaded without a search warrant, such a
search will be presumptively unreasonable. 93 More importantly, how-
ever, Justice Harlan summarized the test that has emerged as a result
of Katz. The test is two-pronged and requires that in order for an area
to be considered constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment: "first ... the person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second that . . . expectation [must be] one
which society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 94 Since its in-
ception in 1967, the Katz test has been cited, in full or in part, in al-
most every Fourth Amendment case the Supreme Court has
considered. 95
Katz had one dissenter, Justice Hugo Black, who felt the majority's
decision reached in the foregoing case was an effectual redrafting of
the Fourth Amendment, designed "to bring it into harmony with the
times" just to reach a result which comports with apparent contempo-
raneous public sentiment. 96
2. Smith v. Maryland 97
Almost twelve years after Katz, the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide another Fourth Amendment case regarding the use of the
telephone and the privacy implications involved therewith in Smith v.
Maryland. A woman named Patricia McDonough was robbed on
March 5, 1976.98 She was able to give the police a description of her
intruder as well as the 1975 Monte Carlo he was driving at the time of
the crime. 99 Shortly thereafter, McDonough began to experience
menacing and obscene phone calls from an individual claiming to be
the robber.100 She also saw what she believed to be the same Monte
Carlo driving by her house and was able to obtain the license num-
ber.10' In tracing the license plate, it was discovered by the police that
93. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
96. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364.
97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
98. Id. at 737.
99. Id.
100. Id. On March 16, 1976 the police actually saw a man fitting the defendant's description
driving through McDonough's neighborhood. Id.
101. Id. at 737 (stating that "[o]n one occasion, the caller asked that she step out on her front
porch; she did so, and saw the 1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier described to police moving
slowly past her home.").
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the registered owner of the car was the petitioner, Michael Lee
Smith.10 2 At the request of the police, the telephone company "in-
stalled a pen register 0 3 at its central offices to record the numbers
dialed from the telephone at [Smith's] home."' 0 4 The police had no
warrant for the pen register.105 The policemen's suspicions were con-
firmed with the employment of the pen register, which showed that on
March 17 a call was placed from Smith's residence to the home of
Patricia McDonough. 0 6 Evidence from the pen register was used to
obtain a warrant of Smith's home where police discovered evidence
incriminating him in the robbery of Patricia McDonough.11 7 Smith
was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery.1118
At a pretrial motion, Smith sought to suppress evidence following
from access to the pen register because no search warrant was ob-
tained for its installation. 09 The trial court denied the motion, I 10 and
Smith was convicted of robbery, receiving a six-year prison sen-
tence."' 1 The Supreme Court was ultimately't 2 called upon to answer
the question of whether the installation and use of a pen register con-
102. Smith. 442 U.S. at 737.
103. Id. A pen register is a device which, when installed by the phone company, records all




107. Smith. 442 U.S. at 737. When the search warrant of Smith's home was executed, the
police discovered a page in his phone book was turned down. Id. This page contained the name
and telephone number of Smith's alleged robbery victim. Patricia McDonough. Id. The phone
book was seized and eventually used as evidence against Smith in the robbery trial. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Smith. 442 U.S. at 737-38. The trial court held that the warrantless installation of the pen
register device was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
I111. Id. at 737.
112. Id. at 738. Prior to his appeal to the Maryland Supreme Court. Smith appealed to the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Id. However, "the Court of Appeals in Maryland issued a
writ of certiorari to the intermediate court in advance of its decision in order to consider whether
the pen register evidence had been properly admitted" at Smith's trial. Id. The court of appeals
in Maryland upheld and confirmed Smith's conviction. Smith. 442 U.S. at 738. Its decision was
based largely on the fact that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to tele-
phone numbers dialed. Id. The court of appeals held that where there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, there can be no search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore a
warrant is immaterial. Id. However, three judges vigorously dissented and argued that there is a
legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to phone numbers. Therefore, absent a warrant.
the installation of a pen register would be constitutionally impermissible. Id. The Maryland
Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, which existed as to the con-
stitutionality of the pen register device. Id.
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stitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 113
The opinion, written by Justice Harold Blackmun, held that the instal-
lation and use of the pen register was not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment." 14
[T]he application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether
the person invoking its protection can claim a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" that has been invaded by government action. This
inquiry normally embraces two questions[: first,] whether the indi-
vidual . . . has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy[; and second,] whether [his or her] expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."' 1 5
A pen register does not disclose the specifics of communication, 16
but it reveals only the numbers that have been dialed. H1 7 "Neither the
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of
the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers." 18 The pen register is non-intrusive in na-
ture, and it lacks disclosure of personal information.11 9
The Court held there is no actual expectation of privacy with regard
to telephone numbers dialed.' 20 It reasoned that the pertinent infor-
mation is routed through the phone company, and all "telephone
users ... must convey phone numbers to the telephone company. ' 121
Subscribers to the phone company realize "that the phone company
has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial,
for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly
bills. 1 22 The Court seemed to admit it was presuming no expectation
of privacy with regard to the telephone numbers dialed. 123 The Court
reasoned, however, that because the general public has knowledge
concerning the operations of the phone company, it "is too much to
113. Id. at 736. The literal question the Supreme Court addressed was "whether a particular
form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
114. Id. at 745-46 (holding "that petitioner in all probability entertained no actual expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did. his expectation was not
'legitimate.' The installation and use of a pen register. consequently, was not a 'search.' and no
warrant was required.").
115. Id. at 740 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361).
116. Id. at 741.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (stating that a pen register is limited in its capabilities).
120. Id. (holding that '[it is doubtful] that people in general entertain any actual expectation
of privacy in the numbers they dial.").
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 743 (stating that subjective expectations with regard to privacy in telephone num-
bers dialed cannot be "scientifically gauged.").
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believe that telephone subscribers ... harbor any general expectation
that the numbers they dial will remain secret.' 12 4 Additionally, even
though Smith placed the calls from within his home, seemingly a sa-
cred area insofar as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the Court
nonetheless found this fact irrelevant. 125  It held that "although
[Smith's] conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his
conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been
calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.' 1 26
In the event Smith subjectively possessed an expectation of privacy,
the Court did not find that expectation to be reasonable.127 The Court
held that there is "no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily [turned] over to third parties." 128 By calling McDonough,
Smith chose to transmit the information regarding the numbers he
was dialing through the phone company. 129 In using the phone, the
Court held that he assumed the risk that the phone company would
turn over the numbers he dialed at the request of the police. 130 The
Court ultimately concluded there was neither an actual expectation of
privacy nor an objectively reasonable one with regard to the tele-
phone numbers dialed.131 Therefore, use of the pen register, without
a warrant, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 32
One dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stewart, stated that the
"numbers dialed from a private telephone are not without content;"'' 33
they could easily reveal details or identity of people and places. 134
Therefore, they should be afforded some privacy protections. 135
124. Id.
125. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (holding that "the site of the call is immaterial for purposes of
analysis in this case.").
126. Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on:
Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone com-
pany in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed
the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could make no con-
ceivable difference, not could any subscriber rationally think that it would.
Id.
127. Id. (stating that "[e]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the
phone number he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not 'one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable."').
128. Id.
129. Id. at 744 (stating that "[w]hen he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed nu-
merical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business.").
130. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
131. Id. at 745.
132. Id. at 745-46.





The other dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
opined that because telephone numbers are private, a person need not
assume that the numbers he or she dials from his home, even if turned
over to third parties, will be used for anything other than a limited
business purpose. 136
3. Florida v. Riley137
Almost ten years after Smith was decided, the Court again ex-
amined the legitimacy of another area of questionable constitutional
protections-the airspace above one's home. Upon receiving an
anonymous tip that respondent Riley was growing marijuana on his
property in rural Florida, an officer of the Pasco County Sheriff's De-
partment was sent to investigate the area surrounding the home. 138
The officer observed a greenhouse, located approximately ten to
twenty feet behind the mobile home. 139 The greenhouse was enclosed
on two sides, making its interior invisible from the street.140 The other
two sides, although not totally obscured, were concealed from view by
trees, shrubbery, and the actual home itself.14 1 The roof of the green-
house was observed to be made of corrugated panels, which were both
translucent and opaque.142 Two of the large panels, however, were
noted to be missing. 143 Because of the obstructions, the officer was
unable to view the contents of the greenhouse.1 44 Instead, he com-
mandeered a helicopter to fly over Riley's house at the height of four
hundred feet where he was able to observe, through the openings in
the roof and the open sides, that there appeared to be marijuana
growing inside the greenhouse.t 45 A warrant was issued, based in
large part upon the observations of Riley's yard from the helicopter,
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own number listed in a publicly
distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast
to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not
because such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could
reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most
intimate details of a person's life.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 749.
137. 488 U.S. 445 (1988).
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and when executed, marijuana was confirmed to be growing inside the
greenhouse. 146
After being charged with possession of marijuana, Riley moved to
suppress this evidence as the tainted fruits of an illegal search in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.1 47  Although the trial court granted
Riley's motion, the court of appeals reversed the decision. 148 Subse-
quently, however, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals. 149 The United States Supreme Court was called upon to an-
swer the question regarding "[w]hether surveillance of the interior of
a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the van-
tage point of a helicopter located four hundred feet above the green-
house constitutes a 'search' for which a warrant is required under the
Fourth Amendment.' 150
In the Court's opinion, written by Justice Byron White,1 51 the Su-
preme Court held that this case was controlled by the decision in Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo.152  In accordance with Ciraolo, the Fourth
Amendment does not require police traveling in the public airways at
an altitude of four hundred feet to obtain a warrant in order to ob-
serve what is already visible to the naked eye. 153 Although historically
146. Id. at 449.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
150. Id. at 447-48.
151. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy. Id. at 447.
152. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Ciraolo is very similar to Riley. In Ciraolo, after the police got a tip
that a Santa Clara resident was growing marijuana in his backyard, the police performed an
aerial surveillance of his house at an altitude of one thousand feet. Id. at 209. A plant resem-
bling marijuana was observed during the flight. Id. A search warrant was issued based on an
affidavit describing the aerial observations, and when the warrant was executed, seventy-three
plants were recovered. Id. The trial court refused to suppress the evidence, and the respondent
subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of cultivating marijuana. Id. at 210. The California
Court of Appeals, however, reversed Riley's conviction and held that such aerial inspection lack-
ing a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court in turn reversed the
California Court of Appeals and held that although a subjective expectation of privacy existed,
(as evidenced by the fence Ciraolo had erected around his property). this expectation of privacy
was not one that was recognized as objectively reasonable. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. The Court
reasoned that the "Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to re-
quire law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thorough-
fares." Id. at 213. Because the observations of the investigating officers "took place within
public navigable airspace in a non-intrusive manner," with only the aid of the naked eye. this
could not be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 214.
153. Riley. 488 U.S. at 450: accord Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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the home and its curtilage 154 have been substantially protected, 155 the
Court in Riley held that neither is automatically protected from public
inspection that does not involve an actual physical intrusion. 156 The
Court held, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."' 157 The police, like the public, have the right to see what is read-
ily visible from a public locale in which they have a legal right to be. 158
Additionally, in this particular case, the police were complying with
airspace laws and regulations, which the Court viewed to be "of obvi-
ous importance, 1159 bolstering the legitimacy of the search.
The Court found it to be of little or no consequence that Riley took
steps to ensure that his marijuana would remain clandestine. 160 Even
if he had an actual expectation of privacy, it was not one recognized as
reasonable by the general public. 61 The Court reasoned that because
private and commercial flight in the airspace above Riley's home and
other similarly situated homes was so pervasive, it would be unreason-
able for Riley to expect his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from naked eye observation. 162 The Court argued that any-
one could legally have been flying over Riley's house in a helicopter at
an altitude of four hundred feet and easily observed the green-
house.163 The Court also found it to be of importance that no per-
sonal minutia of Riley's home was revealed by the helicopter flyby.' 64
154. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (stating "[alt common law, the curtilage is the area to which
extend the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life."').
155. Id. at 212-13 (holding that "[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protec-
tion of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically
and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.").
156. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
157. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
158. Id. at 499 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213).
159. Id. at 452.
160. Id. at 448. Riley enshrouded his backyard with shrubs, trees, and other plants to obscure
the view of the greenhouse from the street. Id. He purposefully enclosed the greenhouse as
much as possible to obscure any observation of its contents. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. Riley also
erected a wire fence arround his mobile home, as well as prominently displayed "DO NOT
ENTER" signs. Id. See also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (holding that it was immaterial that Ciraolo
erected a fence shielding his home and its curtilage from public observation).
161. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
162. Id. (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215) (stating that '[i]n an age where private and commer-
cial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his
marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye [from
an altitude of 400 feet].').
163. Id. at 451.
164. Id. at 450 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215) (stating that "[a]s far as this record reveals, no
intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed .... In these
circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment."). The Court seems to imply
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred with Justice White, but she
cautioned against the proposition that the observation was legal sim-
ply because the helicopter was complying with Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) regulations. 165 Justice O'Connor held that the
proper question to ask was "whether the helicopter was in the public
airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with suffi-
cient regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial obser-
vation was not 'one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
reasonable."''1 66 In this case, Justice O'Connor felt that Riley's expec-
tation of privacy was unreasonable because there was no evidence
contrary to the proposition that there was significant public utilization
of the airspace at four hundred feet. 167 Another dissent, written by
Justice William Brennan, a68 chastised the majority for ignoring the
central holding of Katz. 169 Justice Brennan argued that simply be-
cause a helicopter may occasionally or even frequently fly above an
individual's home does not necessarily imply that one is knowingly
exposing an area to the public.1 70
that because no intimate details were revealed during the helicopter fly-by, no privacy interests
were compromised. Id. at 450.
165. Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONsr. amend. IV) (stating that "[i]n
[her] view, the plurality's approach rests the scope of Fourth Amendment protection too heavily
on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to protect [t]he
right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."').
166. Riley, 488 U.S. at 454 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). In some ways, the requirement of
sufficient regularity of public exposure may be the basis for Justice Scalia's rule in Kyllo regard-
ing technology being in the general public use. Id.
167. Id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor applied the reasoning of Ciraolo
to Riley:
Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the airplane was operat-
ing where it had a 'right to be,' but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently
routine part of modern life that it is unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect
that their curtilage will not be observed from the air at that altitude.
Id. at 453.
168. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent in Riley was joined by
Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens.
169. Id.
The opinion for a plurality of the Court reads almost as if Katz v. United States had
never been decided. Notwithstanding the disclaimers of its final paragraph, the opinion
relies almost exclusively on the fact that the police officer conducted his surveillance
from a vantage point where, under applicable Federal Aviation Administration regula-
tions, he had a legal right to be. Katz teaches, however, that the relevant inquiry is
whether the police surveillance "violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justi-
fiably relied,"-or, as Justice Harlan put it, whether the police violated an "expectation
of privacy .. .that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
Riley, 488 U.S. at 456 (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. at 457.
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Finally, Justice Blackmun also wrote a dissent in which he argued
that the reasonableness of Riley's privacy expectations with regard to
his curtilage depended on how customarily helicopters of a non-police
affiliation fly at four hundred feet. 171 It seemed, at least to Justice
Blackmun, that because such helicopter trips are rare,1 72 a burden
should have fallen upon the prosecution to prove that Riley did not
harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy. 173
4. United States v. Place 174
Although both Smith and Riley dealt with expectations of privacy in
and around the home, the Supreme Court has also examined issues of
Fourth Amendment significance where the home is not involved. In
United States v. Place, respondent Raymond J. Place was standing in
line to board his flight at Miami International Airport destined for
New York's LaGuardia airport.175 He was approached by two DEA
agents, who requested and received Place's airline ticket identifica-
tion. 176 Because his flight was about to leave, the DEA agents de-
cided not to pursue a search at that point. 177 When Place remarked
that he knew the agents were police officials, however, this prompted
the agents to check the address tags on Place's luggage and discrepan-
cies between the street addresses were noted. 178 The agents in Miami
notified other DEA officials at LaGuardia of the situation and the
New York officers approached Place upon his arrival. 179 They in-
formed Place of their suspicions regarding narcotics in his luggage and
asked to search his bags.180 Although he refused, Place's bags were
nonetheless confiscated for roughly ninety minutes and subjected to a
"sniff test" by a canine trained in narcotics detection.'8" The dog re-
acted positively to the presence of drugs and upon the success of this
171. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Although Justice Blackmun stated that helicopter trips are rare, he gives no basis for this
conclusion other than his own opinion. Id. at 468.
173. Id.
174. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).





180. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
181. Id. at 699.
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sniff test a warrant was obtained, 182 and cocaine was discovered inside
Place's luggage. 183
"Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute." 184 At trial, he moved to suppress the evidence of the search,
"claiming that the warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his
Fourth Amendment rights," but his motion was denied by the district
court.185 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
subsequently reversed the decision of the trial court's refusal to sup-
press the cocaine, saying that the prolonged seizure of Place's luggage,
ninety minutes, was a violation of Terry v. Ohio.186 Although the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals regarding
the length of the search being a Fourth Amendment violation,187 it
also reached the question of the constitutionality of canine sniff
tests. 88 In a majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that the particular course of investigation pursued in Place, a ca-
nine sniff test, was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 1 8 9
The Court believed that undoubtedly, there is a privacy interest in
personal luggage.190 A canine test, however, "does not require [the
actual] opening of the luggage."t 9' The Court reasoned that such a
test "does not expose non-contraband items that otherwise would re-
main hidden from the general public."' 192 Because it does not involve
182. Id. This situation took place late on a Friday afternoon. Id. Although the successful
canine sniff test occurred about ninety minutes after confiscation of the luggage, the agents did
not pursue a search warrant of the luggage until Monday morning. Id.
183. Id.
184. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
185. Id. at 700. The district court applied the standard of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to
the detention of personal property. Place. 462 U.S. at 700. The court "concluded that the deten-
tion of the bags could be justified if based on reasonable suspicion to believe that the bags
contained narcotics." Id. Because the canine sniff test provided reasonable suspicion, there was
no violation of Place's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
186. Id. See also Terry. 392 U.S. at 1.
187. Place. 462 U.S. at 709 (noting that -the New York agents knew the time of Place's sched-
uled arrival at LaGuardia. had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that
location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment
interest.").
188. Id. at 707.
189. Id. (concluding "that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to
pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained
canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
190. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)).
191. Id. A canine sniff is a non-intrusive procedure whereby a dog trained in narcotics detec-
tion smells the suspicious luggage while it is still sealed, and signals to its handler if narcotics are
detected. 1d.
192. Place. 462 U.S. at 707. Because luggage is not actually opened, there is no danger of
finding other embarrassing items. Id.
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an agent actually rummaging through someone's personal belongings,
the Court found this sort of search to be much less intrusive than most
searches. 193 This is because the sniff test is very limited in scope; "it
discloses only the presence or absence" of illegal contraband. 194 The
court found that because of the limited nature of the canine sniff test,
there was no risk of embarrassment or inconvenience.t 95
The four cases discussed above represent the culmination of over
three decades worth of search and seizure cases. From these prece-
dents, the Supreme Court has created legal theory that is meant to
govern all similar search and seizure cases. In the case that follows,
however, this precedent was thrown by the wayside.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: KYLLO V. UNITED STATES 19 6
A United States Department of the Interior Agent, William Elliott,
suspected that petitioner, Danny Lee Kyllo, was operating an indoor
marijuana cultivation facility at his home in Florence, Oregon. 97
Since indoor marijuana growth generally requires the use of high in-
tensity lamps to emulate the bright summer sunlight, Agent Elliott
and his partner Dan Haas conducted a thermal scan of Kyllo's
home.1 98 They employed an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal
imager to scan the triplex from the street in front of Kyllo's home. 199
The particular imager that was used detects heat not visible to the
naked eye. 200 The scan20' revealed that the roof over the garage and
the side of Kyllo's home were emitting much greater amounts of rela-
tive heat than the rest of the structure and also the neighboring
homes. 20 2 The readings from the thermal imaging scan bolstered the
agents' suspicions that Kyllo had a marijuana factory in his home that
was fueled by high intensity metal halide lights providing the plants
with the artificial sunlight they needed to undergo photosynthesis. 20 3
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (stating that "this limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intru-
sive investigative methods.").
196. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
197. Id. at 2041.
198. Id. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
199. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
200. Id.
201. Id. The scan took place from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's automobile situated
across the street from Kyllo's home, as well as from the street in back of the house. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. For more information on metal halide lights, see supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
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Based in large part upon the thermal imaging scan, as well as utility
bills from Kyllo's home and tips from informants, a federal magistrate
issued a warrant, which authorized a search of Kyllo's home.20 4 Upon
a search of the home, Haas and Elliott discovered more than one hun-
dred marijuana plants.20 5
Kyllo was indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana. 20 6 He
moved to suppress the evidence that had been taken from his home,
but this motion was denied by the trial court, and Kyllo subsequently
entered a conditional guilty plea.20 7 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit remanded Kyllo's case for an evidentiary
hearing on the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging scan. 20 8 Upon re-
mand, the trial court upheld the validity of the warrant, which relied
in part on the results of the thermal imaging scan.209 Initially, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, but after a change in composition of the
judge's panel that reversal was withdrawn and the decision of the trial
court was affirmed. 210
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine the question of
"whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a private home
from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the
home constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. '211 In a 5-4 decision, the majority opinion, written by Justice
Scalia, held that "[w]here ... the Government uses a device that is not
in general use, to explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. '21 2
Purporting to employ the rule from Katz v. United States,2t 3 the
Court held that a "Fourth Amendment search occurs when the gov-
ernment violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society rec-
204. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
205. Id.
206. Kyllo was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which states "[l1t shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or disperse, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense. a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1999).
207. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
208. Id.
209. Id. The district court's finding was supported by the facts that the thermal imager was
non-intrusive in nature, it emitted neither rays nor beams, it did not show people or activity
within the house, and it lacked the capacity to reveal either conversations or human activities.
Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2040-41.
212. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2046.
213. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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ognizes as reasonable. '214  The majority found an actual and
reasonable expectation of privacy in Kyllo's home had been violated
when officers Elliott and Haas engaged in technological enhancement
of ordinary perception. 215 Obtaining information regarding the inside
of a home that could not have been detected but for the presence of
sense enhancing technology constitutes a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, "at least where (as here) the technology in ques-
tion is not in the general public use. '2 16 The Court found it to be
irrelevant that the imager only exhibited crude heat imagery; "the
Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of the information ob-
tained. ' 217 Besides which, Justice Scalia pointed out, the imager could
show details considered by many to be intimate, such as "what hour
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath. ' 218
The Court found it troubling that there was no reasonable way to limit
the information the Agema Thermovision retrieved. 219 Therefore,
taking all these things into consideration, the Court held that the use
of the Agema Thermovision was an unlawful search violating the
Fourth Amendment.
The dissent, 220 written by Justice John Paul Stevens, contended that
the majority was mistaken in not drawing a distinction between
"through-the-wall" surveillance, which allows the observer direct ac-
cess to private information, and the thought processes used by law
enforcement agents to draw inferences from information that is well
within the public domain. 22' In this case, Agents Haas and Elliott
were simply making "off-the-wall" deductions about what was going
on in Kyllo's house behind closed doors, which Justice Stevens felt
should not have been considered to be a search, nor a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 222 The scan of Kyllo's home was taken from the
public street in front of his house. 223 The Court reiterated that when
214. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2042.
215. Id. at 2043.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2045.
218. Id.
219. Id. (stating that "[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.").
220. Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2047 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2041.
[Vol. 52:201
IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT
observations are made of property in plain view, there is a presump-
tion of reasonableness. 224
No details regarding the intimates of Kyllo's home were obtained
through the scan, just evidence of infrared radiation emanating there-
from.225 Therefore, the dissent felt that without a physical invasion of
the structure this was not "an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises. ' 226 The dissent pointed out that any individual, employ-
ing a number of the human senses, could have detected the extra heat
emanating from Kyllo's home. 227 Heat could have manifested itself by
helping to evaporate rainwater more quickly or melting snow at dif-
ferent rates than in surrounding areas. 228 If this sort of observation
had been made by a neighbor or passerby, there would be no question
as to the constitutionality of that observation.229 Therefore, the dis-
sent felt it was irrelevant that the thermal imager was employed to
obtain identical information.230
The dissent also pointed out that heat waves become part of the
public domain once they leave their source of origin.231 Therefore, it
argued that "[a] subjective expectation that [the heat waves] would
remain private is not only implausible but also surely not 'one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' ' 232 Because heat
waste is technically part of the public domain, the dissent felt it would
be unreasonable to require law enforcement agents to shield their
senses or equipment from detecting emissions such as "smoke, suspi-
cious odors, odorless gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive emis-
sions," because the public has a safety interest in allowing authorities
to sense potentially noxious or dangerous fumes.233 Additionally, the
224. Id. at 2042 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). The dissent also draws on
the holding of Ciraolo to support its contention "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
lic. even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Kvllo.
121 S. Ct. at 2047 (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509).
227. Id. at 2048. This is particularly true if a building is vented. as it was here.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Kvllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2048 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (stating that in his "view ... such obser-
vations become an unreasonable search if made from a distance with the aid of a device that
merely discloses that the exterior of one house, or one area of the house, is much warmer than
another. Nothing more occurred in this case.").
231. Id. The Court analogizes heat waves to aromas that are generated in a kitchen. labora-
tory. or opium den. Id.
232. Id. (citing Katz 389 U.S. 361).
233. Id. at 2049.
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dissent pointed out that the countervailing privacy interest in heat em-
anations is "at best trivial. ' '2 34
Finally, the dissent also criticized the majority as having gone too
far in fashioning its decision. 235 The dissent felt that the majority "un-
fortunately failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial re-
straint. ' 236 Rather than focusing on the constitutionality of the
Agema Thermovision 210, as it was employed in Kyllo, the Court
looked too far into the future, towards more sophisticated technol-
ogy. 2 3 7 The dissent held that it is for the legislature to "grapple with
these emerging issues," not the Court.238
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will demonstrate, through a detailed comparison of
Kyllo with other pertinent Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme
Court's departure from precedent in deciding Kyllo. Comparisons
will be drawn with Smith v. Maryland, Florida v. Riley, and United
States v. Place to exemplify the argument.
A. Breach of Stare Decisis
Stare Decisis is
the means by which [the court] ensures that the law will not merely
change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals, and thereby contribute to the integrity of our constitu-
tional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.239
In other words, stare decisis is the doctrine that binds the courts to the
decisions that have been laid down in previous years. "It represents
the general proposition that a precedent must be followed unless
234. Id. The dissent reasoned that typically, homes are designed to retain heat, rather than to
prevent the detection of its emanations. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2049 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[I]t
does not seem . . . that society will suffer from a rule requiring the rare homeowner who both
intends to engage in uncommon activities that produce extraordinary amounts of heat, and
wishes to conceal that production from outsiders, to make sure that the surrounding area is well
insulated." Id.
235. Id. at 2050 (stating that the "Court has fashioned a rule that is intended to provide essen-
tial guidance for the day when 'more sophisticated systems' gain the 'ability to "see" through
walls and other opaque barriers."').
236. Id. at 2052.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1986).
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there is a compelling reason to overrule it. '' 24° This doctrine should
apply to the reasoning the Court employs, as well as the actual law or
rules it chooses to use.
One commentator has suggested that stare decisis is crucial to the
legal system because it embodies several important qualities.2 41 First,
this doctrine is tied to certainty because it allows people take actions
with assurance that the law as they know it will cease to change.242
Second, stare decisis promotes equality because it ensures that all
cases will be treated alike. 243 Third, the doctrine advances efficiency
because it prevents judges from being forced to readdress many recur-
ring issues.244 Finally, stare decisis legitimizes the appearance of jus-
tice within the legal system by assuring participants that the Court is
an impartial body of government. 245
The Kyllo decision represents a breach of stare decisis. The Court
made a feeble attempt to mask its ugly departure from precedent by
reciting the rule from Katz, 246 but it failed to actually apply the rule in
accordance with other controlling Fourth Amendment precedent. Re-
citing the law, but neglecting altogether the duty to apply it, is simply
not enough to satisfy stare decisis. In Kyllo, instead of using decades
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 247 which could have and should
have been employed in this decision, the Court took it upon itself to
240. Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82
GEO. L.J. 1689, 1691 (1994).
241. Id. This commentator has listed four rationales for stare decisis: certainty, equality, effi-
ciency, and the appearance of justice. Id. at 1689.
242. Id. at 1691. The certainty that has been promoted by the doctrine of stare decisis has
been considered most crucial in contract and property cases. Id. This is because people in these
areas of the law rely heavily on former decisions when they draft their documents. Id. Contrast
this with evidentiary and procedural decisions, which are not relied on nearly as often. Padden,
supra note 240, at 1691.
243. Id. at 1692. The commentator notes that in promoting equality and treating all cases
alike, it is often difficult to determine which cases are actually legally similar for purposes of
applying precedent. Id. The degree of similarity will generally depend on the context out of
which the case arose. Id.
244. Id. Often times difficult policy questions can consume a great amount of judicial re-
sources, especially time. Id. The courts, instead of reanalyzing those questions, can rely on the
decisions of a previous court. Padden, supra note 240, at 1691. The commentator notes, how-
ever, that this rationale may be overstated. Id. She suggests this is because later courts must still
determine what precedent exists and whether it applies to the present circumstance - tasks which
also consume a great amount of time. Id.
245. Id. at 1693. The commentator suggests that the appearance of justice is the most impor-
tant rationale for stare decisis. Id. It promotes the public ideal that a judge will decide cases
based upon already existing law instead of injecting his own biases and morals into the decisions.
Id.
246. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
247. See supra notes 81-195 and accompanying text.
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create a new rule of law,248 seemingly out of thin air. This is problem-
atic because it compromises the Court's appearance of impartiality
and makes it seem as if the judicial system is free to create new law on
a whim. In Kyllo, the Court acknowledged that cases like Riley and
Smith exist, but never addressed the apparent conflict of reasoning
between them and Kyllo. The Court neglected to address the discrep-
ancies because there is simply no explanation for it. The only way the
Court could come to the decision in Kyllo was to pretend that the
reasoning of cases like Smith and Riley did not exist. In doing so, the
Court has departed from precedent. Not only did the Court ad-
vertantly neglect to apply controlling precedent, as is required by stare
decisis, it created a shadow of doubt over the predictability and pro-
priety of Supreme Court decisions.
B. The Kyllo Decision Ignores All Pertinent Reasoning Formerly
Employed in Smith v. Maryland.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court neglected to recognize and apply
the principles of Smith v. Maryland, which could have been control-
ling in this case. Specifically, the Court failed to realize that: (1) a
thermal imager can be considered analogous to a pen register device;
(2) there is a lack of expectation of privacy with respect to heat emis-
sions for the same reasons there is a lack of expectation of privacy
with regard to telephone numbers; and (3) because information in-
volving electricity consumption, like telephone use, is turned over to a
third party, the utility provider, any expectation of privacy with regard
to such is presumptively unreasonable.
1. A Thermal Imager is Analogous in its Capabilities to a Pen
Register
Recall that in Smith there was a question of whether the installation
of a pen register, which revealed all phone numbers dialed from a
residence, constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.249 The Smith Court properly began its evaluation of this
issue by calling upon the rule enunciated in Katz v. United States.250
In determining that there was a lack of an actual expectation of pri-
248. See supra notes 196-238 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
250. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
Consistent with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a "justi-
fiable," a "reasonable," or a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that has been invaded
by a government action . . . . This inquiry ... normally embraces two discrete questions.
The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective)
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vacy in this case, the Court considered the nature of the intrusion of a
pen register:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from
the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These
devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone num-
bers that have been dialed-a means of establishing communica-
tion. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call
was even completed is disclosed by pen registers. 251
Particularly because of the limited nature of a pen register, the peti-
tioner needed to make a persuasive showing of an actual expectation
of privacy with regard to the telephone numbers he dialed. 252
In Kyllo, Justice Scalia was quick to point out the dangers of more
sophisticated technology whose inception appeared to be right around
the corner, 253  but he neglected to recognize that the Agema
Thermovision 210 is actually quite analogous in its capabilities to a
pen register. The Kyllo Court should have conceded that a thermal
imager bears striking similarities to a pen register, which the Court
already found to be a constitutionally acceptable weapon of police en-
forcement. 254 A pen register does not disclose to police whether any
illegal communication exists. A thermal imager also does not reveal
whether there is any illegal activity inside the home. 255 A pen register
merely reports telephone numbers, which have been dialed from a
residence-a means of establishing communication. A thermal
imager reveals only the heat that emanates from the home and its
surroundings-a means of establishing tepidity.25 6 With a pen regis-
ter, there is no disclosure of the context of any supposed communica-
tion, the reason for the phone call, nor the identity of the caller or the
expectation of privacy. The second question is whether the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Id.
251. Id. at 741 (citing United States v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
252. Id. at 742. "Given a pen register's limited capabilities, therefore, petitioner's argument
that its installation and use constitutes a 'search' necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone." Id.
253. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 n.3 (noting that "[t]he ability to 'see' through walls and other
opaque barriers is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law enforcement research and devel-
opment."). Justice Scalia mentioned a flashlight or handheld type ultrasound, which would en-
able police officials to see persons through the interior wall of a building. Id.
254. See supra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
255. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a]s still images from the
infrared scans show ... no details regarding the interior of petitioner's home were revealed.").
256. Id. at 2048 (noting that "[a]ll that the infrared camera did in this case was passively
measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of petitioner's home: all that those measure-
ments showed were relative differences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that some areas of
the roof and outside walls were warmer than others.").
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recipient. With a thermal imager, there is no disclosure as to the con-
text of the heat is being used, the reason for the greater amount of
heat, nor the identity of the object emitting the heat. 257
When the two types of technology are compared side by side, their
similarities are readily apparent. Both are limited in scope, informa-
tion of details, and level of intrusion. 258 Considering this analogy, why
was the Court so quick to hold that the thermal imager is necessarily
offensive technology, but the pen register is not? Justice Scalia would
likely argue that the thermal imager poses a greater danger to society
because it tracks heat inside the house, whereas a pen register only
tracks a person's phone calls. This would be an improper argument;
the Agema Thermovision 210 "cannot penetrate walls or windows to
reveal conversations or other human activities. The device record[s]
only the heat being emitted from the home. ' '259 Considering this, it
seems as if it is no more offensive to use a thermal imager than it is to
use a pen register.
Justice Scalia appeared to have anticipated this hypothetical argu-
ment and stated that although the thermal imager did not reveal any
specific details of the home, the Fourth Amendment's protection will
not be adjudged by the quality of information a search reveals. 260
Whatever details the thermal imager did extract were intimate by na-
ture because they came from the home. 261  Considering Smith, how-
ever, this logic is flawed. It would only seem logical to follow that if
reasoning the telephone numbers being dialed from within an individ-
ual's home are not considered to be an intimate detail within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, then the heat rays emanating
257. Id at 2047 (stating that "the case before us merely involves indirect deductions from 'off-
the-wall' surveillance, that is observations of the exterior of the home."). Justice Stevens seems
to be saying that the thermal imager provides some crude and primitive information to police
officials, but it is up to police to use their training and intuition to apply that information and
determine that something is amiss.
258. It should be noted that the actual capabilities of the thermal imaging device are widely
debated. One commentator has noted this dispute and offered an alternative view of the ther-
mal imaging device. Jonathan Todd Laba, If You Can t Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug
Business: Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1437, 1466 (1996). In referencing the case of State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994). the
commentator states that the thermal imagers can "detect the presence of a person standing next
to a curtained window or behind a wall made of a thin material such as plywood." Id. In effect,
this is like seeing through a wall. The devices can also be used to determine what rooms of a
home are being heated and occupied at night, as well as which rooms contain appliances which
produce heat. Id.
259. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2047 n.1.
260. Id. at 2045 (stating that "[tihe Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.").
261. Id. (stating that "[in the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.").
[Vol. 52:201
IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT
from a home should also not be considered constitutionally signifi-
cant.262 Whether the Court deliberately neglected to recognize this
argument, or whether it negligently failed to do so is unknown. How-
ever, the crux of stare decisis is the duty of the Court to recognize and
employ all pertinent precedent and properly dispose of that which is
not controlling.263 This Note argues that the Court, in failing to recog-
nize the similarities of a thermal imager and a pen register and to
make concessions for those similarities in its opinion, has departed
from and largely ignored controlling precedent. This severely curbs
the Supreme Court's reputation as a predictable, fair, and impartial
arm of government.
2. The (Lack of a) Subjective Expectation of Privacy With Respect
to Heat is Analogous to the (Lack of a) Subjective
Expectation of Privacy With Respect to Telephone
Numbers
The Smith Court held that no actual expectation of privacy exists in
the telephone numbers people choose to dial from their homes.264 It
reasoned that all people realize, when they place telephone calls, that
the phone numbers dialed are conveyed back to the telephone com-
pany for completion of the call.265 Subscribers to a telephone service
are aware that the phone company has the capacity to make records
of all the numbers dialed, particularly because most users see a list of
long distance phone calls on their monthly invoices.266 It is inherent
in the use of the telephone system that callers are aware that they
must convey numerical information to the phone company.267 Al-
though the Court lacked empirical evidence to support this proposi-
262. It would seem to the author of this Note that the heat emanating from an individual's
home would be a much less obtrusive piece of information than what phone numbers a person is
dialing. The author cannot recall the last time she gave a second thought to the amount of heat
her home was giving off. Additionally, the phone numbers are coming from within the home.
which should seem to make the information constitutionally significant. according to Justice
Scalia. However, with a thermal imager, the pertinent information is emanating from the home.
not being extracted from within. By nature, the source of the information should have made the
scan less intrusive. If the Court is going to say that heat is an intimate detail by nature of its
source in the home, it would be only proper that the phone numbers a person dials are also
considered intimate.
263. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
264. Smith, 422 U.S. at 742 (stating that "[wie doubt that people in general entertain any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.").
265. Id. at 742 (stating that -[a]ll telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone num-
bers to the telephone company. since it is through telephone company switching equipment that





tion, the Court relied on its own intuition to determine that there is
not an actual expectation of privacy with regard to the phone numbers
dialed.268
Electricity users (as in Kyllo) are similarly situated to telephone
users (as in Smith). As anyone who utilizes electricity knows, (quite
possibly the vast majority of Americans), at the end of the billing cy-
cle, subscribers receive an invoice from the electric company reporting
how much energy they have used and what the current charges are.
As is the case with users of the telephone, all users of electricity real-
ize that the amount of energy transferred is essentially conveyed back
to the electric company for these billing and record keeping pur-
poses. 269 Like users of the telephone, users of electricity rely on the
company to provide them with the pertinent services. All users also
must innately realize that the electric company, like the phone com-
pany, has facilities for making records of the amount of electricity
transferred, because they receive a bill at the end of every relevant
cycle. 270 It is true that there is no scientific evidence showing that
users of electricity completely lack an expectation of privacy with re-
gard to the amount of electricity they consume. However, the Court
in Kyllo, like the Court in Smith, should have considered all the ways
in which users of electricity are essentially forced to share their con-
sumption with the electric company. "It would be too much to believe
that" electricity subscribers, like phone subscribers, "under these cir-
cumstances, harbor any general expectation that the "amount of elec-
tricity they consume 'will remain secret.' 27' One commentator has
even gone so far as to say a phone conversation is actually more pri-
vate than the heat that is emitted from one's home, leading to the
conclusion that a phone conversation, rather than the heat emissions,
should actually get more privacy protection. 272
As this Note has done, one could virtually substitute the words
"electric company," for that of "phone company" in Smith, and come
up with a very persuasive argument for why there was no actual ex-
pectation of privacy with regard to heat consumed in Kyllo. Yet the
268. Id. at 743 (stating that "[a]lthough subjective expectations cannot be scientifically
gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.').
269. Id.
270. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
271. Id. The author of this Note has deliberately used the language of Smith to show how,
when "electric company" is substituted for "phone company." the reasoning employed in Smith
should have been controlling in Kyllo.
272. Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment Search-Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New "Bright-
Line" Rule in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 Wyo. L. REV.
169. 197 (2002).
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Court failed to do so. Although Justice Scalia mentioned the test from
Katz,273 he never actually stated that there was an actual expectation
of privacy with regard to heat emanations or consumption. One could
infer that he was implying an actual expectation of privacy when he
talked about heat being a detail of the home, and accordingly, all de-
tails of the home being intimate. 274 This Note, however, has already
raised the question of whether, in light of Smith, heat really could be
considered an intimate detail of the home. 275 The issue of whether
heat is indeed an intimate detail of the home, and if so, whether there
is an actual expectation of privacy with regard to heat emitted, is at
the crux of determining the first prong of the Katz test in this case.
Smith is controlling, persuasive, and highly relevant precedent. It is
unfortunate, as well as curious, that Smith's reasoning was largely
ignored in the employment of the Katz test in Kyllo. The Court's in-
ability to confront pertinent precedent significantly weakens the legiti-
macy of its authority, as well as the persuasiveness of its arguments. 276
3. Expectations of Privacy With Regard to Heat Consumption, Like
Telephone Numbers, are Presumptively Unreasonable Because
They are Voluntarily Turned Over to a Third Party
In Smith, the Court held, should it accept the proposition that the
petitioner did indeed possess an actual subjective expectation of pri-
vacy with regard to the telephone numbers he dialed, this belief was
still not "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 277
In the absence of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court will not find a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court's refusal to recognize a privacy interest in telephone
numbers as objectively reasonable is deeply rooted in precedent. 278
273. Kvllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043 (stating that "'in the case of the search of the interior of homes
... there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law. of the minimal expectation of
privacy that exists., and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.").
274. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2045.
275. See supra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
276. This author believes that when the Court fails to address controlling precedent, it weak-
ens the legitimacy of the Court because it creates the appearance that the Court is not actually
bound by precedent. Rather, it makes the Court look as if. on a whim. it can change existing
law. It undermines the appearance of the Court as a neutral and detached entity. If these sorts
of departures from precedent continue on a frequent basis, the author believes American citi-
zens will eventually lose their faith in the judicial system to be a reliable and predictable source
of justice. See also Padden. supra note 240 at 1693 (stating that the appearance of justice is the
most important rationale for stare decisis).
277. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
278. 1d. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976): Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322. 335-36 (1973): United States v. White. 401 U.S. 745. 752 (1971): Hoffa v.
United States. 385 U.S. 293. 302 (1966): Lopez v. United States. 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
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This is because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. ' 279 Smith made
a choice, when he voluntarily used his telephone, that the information
he was transmitting would be immediately conveyed back to the tele-
phone company.280 He "assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to police the numbers he dialed."'281 Because Smith voluntarily
turned over the numbers he dialed to the phone company, even an
actual expectation of privacy would be considered unreasonable. 282
The logic of Smith is, in theory and in application, relevant to Kyllo.
Assume that Kyllo did harbor a subjective expectation of privacy with
regard to the amounts of electricity he was consuming, and accord-
ingly, how much heat his home was emanating. This expectation
should not be one that is considered reasonable, because just like in
Smith, he voluntarily turned over his consumption level to the electric
company. Kyllo was fully aware that, by plugging in the metal halide
lights, the information he was generating regarding heat and electric-
ity would be conveyed back to the electric company. Kyllo, in so do-
ing, assumed there was a risk that the information being relayed back
to the electric company would be handed over to the authorities.283
Where there is a voluntary conveyance of information to a third party,
any actual expectation of privacy is not one which society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable. Therefore, any privacy interests possessed
by Kyllo are constitutionally irrelevant insofar as the Fourth Amend-
ment is concerned because they are objectively unreasonable. One
commentator has even suggested that the most intimate of details, if
exposed to the public, will not be protected from search or seizure by
the Fourth Amendment. 284
279. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
280. Id. at 744 (stating that "[w]hen he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed nu-
merical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business.").
281. Id.
282. Id. at 744-45. The Court reasoned that "[t]he switching equipment that processe[s]
[phone] numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, per-
sonally completed calls for the subscriber." Id. A different result is not warranted simply be-
cause the process is now automated. Id. at 744.
283. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041. In actuality, this information was relayed to the authorities.
The warrant from the Federal Magistrate, which authorized the search of Kyllo's home, (ulti-
mately resulting in the discovery of over one hundred marijuana plants) was supported in part by
his utility bills. Id. Although the Court does not specify the source of those bills, one may
assume that the electric company probably turned over those bills voluntarily; it is highly un-
likely Kyllo was handing them out.
284. Laba, supra note 258, at 1456. The commentator suggests Smith stands for a hard line
rule that where any activity, statement, or object is exposed to the public, even in the most
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One may argue that using electricity cannot be considered a volun-
tary relinquishment of information because users of electricity have
no choice but to go through the utility company if they want electric-
ity. In that sense, the transmission of information appears to be more
forced than it does to be voluntary. The same argument, however, is
true for telephone users. Anyone who wants to make a phone call has
no choice but to go through the provider, and in the process, turn over
all numbers dialed. Despite an attempt by Justice Marshall, dissenting
in Smith, to raise such an argument in response to the voluntariness of
relinquishment of telephone information, 285 the majority nonetheless
squarely held that use of a telephone constitutes a voluntary disclo-
sure of information to a third party. 28 6 It is only reasonable to assume
that if making a phone call is a voluntary act of revealing information
to the telephone company, the voluntary act of plugging in a lamp
must also be considered the relinquishment of information to the elec-
tric company.
The Court in Kyllo completely failed to recognize the possibility
that because Kyllo was effectively handing over information to the
electric company any expectation of privacy he held was objectively
unreasonable. This principle is firmly embedded in precedent, 28 7 and
has been employed in circumstances other than telephone calls. 288 It
was improper for the Kyllo Court to ignore controlling precedent and
not to have addressed the third party issue.
Justice Scalia instead argued that the expectation of privacy was
reasonable with regard to a thermal imaging scan of a home in Kyllo.
Although the Agema Thermovision 210 is "relatively crude" imagery,
the nature of the technology "might disclose, for example, at what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath-
a detail that many would consider 'intimate.' 28 9 However, consider a
pen register that reveals a telephone user is calling a sex hotline every
night at 2:00 a.m. Would this not be considered to reveal an intimate
minimal way, there is a risk that the third party will report the exposed information to the public.
Id. This is true no matter how intimate the thing exposed actually is. Id.
285. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[u]nless a person is pre-
pared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity. he cannot
help but accept the risk of surveillance[:] [i]t is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.").
286. Id. at 744 (stating that "[t]his analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy here.").
287. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976) (holding that where a bank
patron has no legitimate expectation of privacy in financial information which is voluntarily con-
veyed to a bank and its tellers during the ordinary course of a deposit).
289. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2045.
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detail of someone's private life? One may assume, through general
knowledge and experience, that it would be more embarrassing for a
third party to infer one is engaging in profane, perverse, or even ob-
scene conversations late at night, than it would be for a third party to
deduce one bathes every evening at 8:00 p.m. Bound by the doctrine
of stare decisis, the Court should not ignore the fact that in Smith, the
same dangers of embarrassment were present, but not prevalent
enough to warrant excluding the fruits of the pen register search. In
reading Smith, it would seem that simply because there is a risk of
embarrassment, that does not necessarily imply that police officials
should cease surveillance altogether. If he were bold enough, Justice
Scalia could have probably taken his argument even one step further
and posed the scenario of whether an intimate couple's privacy in the
bedroom was being compromised by a thermal imaging scan. This ar-
gument, however, is easily disposed of because the Agema Thermovi-
sion 210 cannot reveal human activities.2 90
C. The Kyllo Decision Ignores All Pertinent Reasoning Formerly
Employed in Florida v. Riley
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court neglected to recognize and apply
the principles of Florida v. Riley, which could have been controlling in
this case. Specifically, the Court failed to recognize that: (1) anything
exposed to the public renders it unprotected under the Fourth
Amendment; (2) the police have a right to make observations from a
public vantage point, as they did in Riley; and (3) the locale of the
search was public domain, just as the airspace was in Riley.
1. Exposure to the Public Renders Privacy Interests Unprotected
Under the Fourth Amendment
Recall that in Riley, a helicopter flyby resulting in the discovery of
marijuana plants was not considered to be a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. 291 The Court's reasoning rested most
heavily on the proposition that "what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ' 292 It can be inferred that this is because,
under the Katz test, one cannot claim a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy over something readily visible to the public.2 93 Because the mari-
juana plants were easily observable from the airspace above Riley's
290. Id. at 2047 n.1.
291. Riley. 488 U.S. at 450.
292. Id. at 450 (citing Katz. 389 U.S. at 351).
293. Id. at 449.
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home and yard, the Court considered them to be exposed to the pub-
lic, and therefore not the subject of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.2 94
Similarly, in Kyllo, the heat rays emanating from Kyllo's home
should not have warranted special Fourth Amendment protection be-
cause they were knowingly exposed to the public. Although the infra-
red images were unavailable to the general public, ordinary use of the
senses could have enabled a passerby or neighbor to notice the heat
emanating from the home. The increased heat could manifest itself
physically by melting snow on the warmer side of the home, or by
evaporating rainwater more quickly, as the dissent pointed out.295
Such an exposure to the public renders any privacy interest that Kyllo
may have had unreasonable. 296
The Court argued that it is irrelevant that an outsider could have
eventually observed the discrepancies in temperature outside of
Kyllo's home had he surveyed it for a long enough period of time.297
The fact is that police officers were aided by infrared technology, ca-
294. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (stating that "the Fourth Amendment simply does not require
the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe
what is visible to the naked eye.").
295. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2048 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice
the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here.
Additionally, any member of the public might notice that one part of a house is warmer
than another part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow
melts at different rates across its surfaces.
Id.
296. It should be noted that not all commentators believe the plain-view type analogy is appli-
cable in this circumstance. See Campisi. supra note 62. at 268. This commentator has noted that
the plain-view analogy in misguided, "because thermal heat emissions are invisible to the naked
eye and can be detected only through the use of highly sophisticated technology." Id. The plain
view doctrine is based on the ability to observe something without the aid of technological en-
hancements. Id.
Although Mr. Campisi makes a good point, it is not controlling for this Note. First. the "plain-
view" analogy being advanced here is one where a police officer could have observed physical
manifestations of the heat around Kyllo's home. It is not being suggested that by merely stand-
ing outside the home, somehow that officer's vision would enable him or her to see heat rays.
Rather. it is suggested that naked-eye observation would indeed be possible if one waited long
enough for those manifestations to occur.
Additionally. Mr. Campisi's definition of plain-view is at odds with this note's interpretation of
Riley. Indeed, the whole argument here is that the police technologically enhanced their vision
by flying in the helicopter to view just that which could not be seen from the ground with the
naked eye.
297. Kvllo, 121 S. Ct. 2044 n.2.
The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does
not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment. The police
might, for example. learn how many people are in a particular house by setting up year-
round surveillance: but that does not make breaking and entering to find out the same
information lawful.
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pable of seeing images of radiation otherwise invisible to the human
eye.298 In light of Riley, however, one cannot ignore the obvious ques-
tion: how is this scenario different from the police officer who, after
attempting and failing to use his naked eye capabilities to see inside a
greenhouse, uses a helicopter to enhance his view? 299 Or how does
this differ from the situation where a police officer, unable to detect
contraband with his own nose, employs a canine to sniff a suitcase for
illicit substances, thus enhancing his ability to detect drugs?3°° One
commentator has suggested that the difference lies in the fact that
thermal imaging does not correspond to any natural sense, where as
something like a canine sniff does.30' But does this really dispose of
the questions as to whether something be considered within naked-
eye observations if one needs to fly in a helicopter to observe it? The
Court in Riley seemed to say yes. In accordance with Riley, it would
seem that because the heat emanating from Kyllo's home would feasi-
bly have been able to manifest itself such that any member of the
public could have seen it, it would be subsequently irrelevant, as was
the case in Riley, that an officer may have had to enhance his eyesight
a bit to actually see the pertinent evidence.
298. Id. at 2043 (stating that "[t]he present case involves officers on a public street engaged in
more than naked-eye surveillance of a home.").
299. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. In Riley, when an investigating officer discovered that he could
not observe from ground level the contents of a greenhouse, enclosed on two sides and obscured
by tress and shrubbery on the others, he commandeered a helicopter to fly over the property so
he could peer in the backyard. Id.
300. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). At LaGuardia airport, police officers
subjected respondent Place's suitcase to a sniff test by a narcotics trained detection dog. Id. The
Court held that a canine sniff does not violate the Fourth Amendment because a canine sniff
does not require opening the luggage. Id. at 707. Additionally, the manner by which pertinent
information is obtained is much less intrusive than a typical search. Id. at 707.
301. See Laba, supra note 258, at 1472. The commentator states that '[u]nlike a telescope or
camera, which enhances our eyesight, or a dog sniff, which augments our sense of smell, devices
such as thermal imagers do not correspond to our natural senses." Id. Instead, he suggests, the
technology only gives a means to discover and interpret data, which without the technology we
would be unable to do. Id.
But how much sense does this argument really make? Does a canine sniff really augment our
senses'? Not really. It is not a tool by which we enhance our senses, rather we are substituting
the dog's more advanced smell for our own. Human senses are not developed enough to allow
detection of contraband. No matter how hard we try, humans will never replace the canine in
sniff tests. The purpose of the canine sniff, it can be said, is to allow police to discover and
interpret data, which, without technology, police would be unable to do. But this is exactly what
Mr. Laba says is the evil behind thermal imaging. Again, it has to be asked, how much sense
does the commentator's argument really make? Under Mr. Laba's own reasoning, it seems that
thermal imaging would be just as allowable as a canine sniff for the reasons delineated above.
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2. The Police May See What May Legally be Seen From a Public
Vantage Point
The Court in Riley went to great pains to emphasize the importance
of the fact that when the police were flying over Riley's home, they
had a right to be there. 30 2 But for the obstruction of the trees and
shrubbery, the police could have peered into Riley's backyard garden
and seen the plants.30 3 Therefore, it follows logically that the police
also have a right to look into Riley's yard from the airspace above his
home. 30 4 The Court also emphasized the importance of the fact that
when the helicopter was surveying Riley's home, it was complying
with FAA regulations. 30 5 It even goes so far as to imply that if the
helicopter had been flying in illegal airspace, the constitutionality of
the search may have been compromised. 30 6 The legitimacy of the
search was additionally bolstered, in the Court's eyes, by the fact that
there was no interference with Riley's normal use of his property. 30 7
Under the aforementioned circumstances, 30 8 in which there were no
intimate details of the home revealed, no undue noise, and no wind,
dust, or threat of injury, the Court held there would be no violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 30 9
When they performed the thermal imaging scan, Agents Haas and
Elliott were across the street from Kyllo's home. 310 The street is in the
public domain. The agents were not on Kyllo's front lawn, nor were
they physically touching the triplex. The rays of the thermal imaging
device did not even penetrate the walls of the building. 31I As the
302. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 351) (stating that "[a]s a general
proposition, the police may see what may be seen 'from a public vantage point where [they have]
a right to be.').
303. Id. at 449-50 (stating that "[t]he police, like the public, would have been free to inspect
the backyard garden from the street if their view had been unobstructed.").
304. Id. at 450 (stating that "[t]hey were likewise free to inspect the yard from the vantage
point of an aircraft flying in the navigable airspace as this plane was.").
305. Id. at 451.
306. Id. (stating that "it is of obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was not violat-
ing the law .. ") (emphasis added). The use of the phrase "obvious importance" implies that
the Court would have taken greater issue with the helicopter flyby had it occurred in airspace
not designated public by the law.
307. Id. at 452 (stating that "there [is no ... ] intimation here that the helicopter interfered
with respondent's normal use of the greenhouse or of the other parts of the curtilage.").
308. Pertinent circumstances include, for example, seeing from a public vantage point where
the police have a right to be and compliance with FAA regulations.
309. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
310. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041 (stating that "[t]he scan of Kyllo's home ... was performed from
the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the street.").
311. Lomas. supra note 65. at 800 (citing United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041. 1044 (9th Cir.
1999)). Lomas states "a thermal imager passively records thermal emissions, acting much like a
camera, rather than emitting intrusive beams or rays." Id.
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Court held in Riley, these agents should have had a right to see what
may be seen from the public vantage point of the street in front of
Kyllo's home.312 Recall that in Riley, because the police could have
inspected the yard from the street but for the obstruction, it followed
that they had a right to make a helicopter-enhanced inspection from
the public airspace. This same principle should have been applied in
Kyllo. Because Agents Elliott and Haas could have inspected the
physical manifestations of the increased heat emanating from Kyllo's
home,313 they should have the right to make a thermally enhanced
inspection from the public street.314 The Kyllo Court improperly ig-
nored this pertinent analysis from Riley, which should have been con-
trolling precedent.
The two agents were complying with the law by not trespassing on
Kyllo's property. In Riley, compliance with FAA regulations played a
decisive role in the Court's decision to legitimize the helicopter sur-
veillance. 315 In Kyllo, however, the Court did not recognize, or even
give any credence to the fact that the officers were following the law
at the time the scan was taken. Why was adherence to the law a con-
trolling factor in Riley, but blatantly ignored in Kyllo? This fact
should have been taken under consideration by Justice Scalia and the
majority. Failure to do so constitutes another departure from prece-
dent, thus compromising the legitimacy that necessarily must accom-
pany all Supreme Court decisions.
Finally, in Kyllo, as in Riley, there were no intimate details of the
home or its curtilage revealed by the scan.316 The thermal imaging
device did not exude any sound or noise.317 It did not create any nui-
sance to Kyllo, nor did it present a threat of injury. The Court in Riley
found these to be relevant factors as to why the helicopter surveillance
was legal-it did not in any way burden the respondent. 318 If any-
thing, one could infer that a thermal imaging device-an innocuous
piece of stealthy machinery-would be considerably less burdensome
than a helicopter-a multi-ton whirling piece of iron and metal. Why
does the Court in Riley allow a lack of nuisance to the respondent
312. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
313. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
314. One commentator has suggested it is significant that "we cannot walk up to a home.
touch the wall, and form a conclusion as to whether there is a hydroponics operation inside."
Laba. supra note 258. at 1472. Rather, it is technology and technology alone with even allows to
us draw these inferences of hydroponics in the first place. Id.
315. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
316. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
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determine the legitimacy of the helicopter surveillance, but the Court
in Kyllo did not even consider such a thing? In accordance with Riley,
the Kyllo Court should have considered such an argument in deciding
the case. Failure to adhere to the pertinent analysis from Riley repre-
sents a total disregard for relevant precedent and forces outsiders to
question the strength of stare decisis and the legitimacy of the
decision.
3. The Street in Front of Kyllo's Home Where the Search Took
Place is Prone to Public Traffic, Just Like the Airspace
Above Riley's Home
The Riley Court held that "[i]n an age where private and commer-
cial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for re-
spondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from being observed with the naked eye. '319 It said that
any desirous member of the public could have legally flown over
Riley's yard and discovered the marijuana in the greenhouse. 320
Therefore, even though Riley took precautions to protect his mari-
juana from being seen,321 such an expectation of privacy is not one
which society would be willing to recognize as reasonable where the
contraband is visible to the public from a helicopter. 322
Consider for a moment how often the average American actually
flies in a helicopter. The author of this Note has never been in a heli-
copter, nor even seen one up close. The author cannot recall the last
time she flew from any altitude, much less four hundred feet, (as was
the case in Riley) and observed something as specific as what type of
foliage a citizen was cultivating.323 It is true that there may be select
members of the public who fly in helicopters regularly (e.g. news re-
porters, traffic reporters), but by and large the general public seems to
enjoy no similar experience. The Riley Court, however, was nonethe-
319. Id. (citing Ciraolo. 476 U.S. at 215).
320. Id. at 451.
321. Id. at 448.
Two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed. The other two sides were not enclosed but
the contents of the greenhouse were obscured from view from surrounding property by
trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. The greenhouse was covered by corrugated roof-
ing, panels, some translucent and some opaque .. . . A wire fence surrounded the
mobile home and the greenhouse, and the property was posted with a "DO NOT
ENTER" sign.
1d.
322. Id. at 450 (noting 'Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not
be open to public inspection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level
observations.").
323. Riley,. 488 U.S. at 448.
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less persuaded that the general public flies in helicopters at such a
high frequency as to warrant the airspace above Riley's home public
domain, despite the fact that in reality, it is likely that the vast major-
ity of Americans have never been in a helicopter. 324 This logic was
essential to the Court's reasoning in Riley, which served to legitimize
the helicopter flyby.
Applying the same logic to the situation in Kyllo, it is reasonable to
assume that most Americans, with some element of regularity, stroll
down a street and take note of the particularities of a house: what
color the shutters are, how many garages a house has, and so on. It
can also be assumed that public observation of streets and homes in
neighborhoods is readily accessible by foot, car, or bike on a daily
basis. It is fair to say that such ground-level observations occur with
considerably more regularity than observations of foliage made from a
helicopter. This being noted, the Court in Kyllo, bound by the rule of
Riley, should not have ignored that fact that any member of the public
could have walked by Kyllo's home and noticed, for example, that
snow was melting more rapidly on the right side of the building.325
Justice Scalia felt that this argument was frivolous and irrelevant.326
But it is no more far-fetched to say that any interested citizen could
have observed the physical manifestations of heat emanating from the
home than it is to say that any member of the public would have been
free to commandeer a helicopter to fly over Riley's home. To reiter-
ate: even if Kyllo subjectively believed he had a right to privacy with
regard to heat emanations, it is objectively unreasonable to expect a
right to privacy where physical manifestations of those emanations
could have feasibly been observed by any member of the public. This
analytical aspect of Riley is not only relevant to Kyllo, it should have
been persuasive in determining that Kyllo did not possess an expecta-
tion of privacy that society would be willing to recognize as reasona-
ble. Once again, the Court has inappropriately ignored other
congruous Fourth Amendment precedent.
It could be argued that merely witnessing snow melting is not the
same thing as determining that a special lamp was being used to grow
marijuana. Although this is a valid argument, it is misplaced.
Whether one sees snow melt and infers that there must be a large
324. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
325. See Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2047 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that particularly where a
home is vented, as was the case with Kyllo, physical manifestations of heat would be readily
visible to any passerby).
326. See id. at 2043 n.2 (stating that the ability to observe snowmelt on the roof is "quite
irrelevant.").
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concentration of heat, or whether one performs a thermal imaging
scan and actually sees the heat on a screen, is irrelevant; in either case,
one still must deduce the source of the heat as a metal halide light.
Because neither seeing snow melting nor performing a thermal imag-
ing scan would actually tell one that a metal halide light was being
used to grow marijuana, the most significant difference in the two
types of observations is simply how much time the surveillance
occupies.
D. The Legitimacy of the Kyllo Decision is Compromised by
Previous Fourth Amendment Precedent
The crux of Justice Scalia's holding in Kyllo rests on the proposition
that the constitutionality of a device used for surveillance will depend
upon whether the device is in the "general public use. ' 327 The new
requirement that something be generally available to the public prior
to police employment of that device is undermined by the authority of
the Fourth Amendment precedent discussed in the background sec-
tion of this Note.328
In Smith v. Maryland, the police employed a pen register to deter-
mine what telephone numbers had been dialed from an individual's
home. 329 The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of such
a search and held that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 330
But under Kyllo, it seems as if before the police could use such a de-
vice, one would have to ask how readily available this technology is to
the general public. A pen register, in fact, is a device geared specifi-
cally for law enforcement purposes, and not for individual use. 331 It
would seem then, that under the reasoning of Kyllo, because a pen
register is arguably not considered to be commonly available to the
general public, the employment of a pen register should be unconsti-
tutional. But the Court already held in Smith that use of a pen regis-
ter is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.332 How should Smith
be regarded in light of Kyllo?
327. Id. at 2046.
328. See supra notes 81-195 and accompanying text.
329. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
330. Id. at 746.
331. A corporation called Pen-Link, which manufactures and sells pen register devices, states
that the "product is aimed specifically to law enforcement agencies." They do sell to some small
investigative firms and law offices, but not to individuals. Email from Pen-Link to Carrie Gros-
kopf (Dec. 10. 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
332. Smith. 442 U.S. at 736.
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In Florida v. Riley, a helicopter was used to perform aerial surveil-
lance of the backyard of a resident's home. 333 After careful considera-
tion, the Court held that it is not a violation of Fourth Amendment
rights to use a helicopter to peer into a yard. 334 Under Kyllo, the
proper inquiry as to the constitutionality of this search would seem to
be whether a helicopter is in the general public use. It is common
knowledge that helicopters are used largely for military and police
powers, news organizations, and occasionally by the extremely
wealthy. 335 But by and large, helicopters are not something readily
available to a member of the public-at least one who does not have a
lot of money. A helicopter is neither practical nor affordable. Under
Kyllo, then, it would seem that a helicopter search would have to be
considered unconstitutional because the device is not in the general
public use. Yet it has already been established that such surveillance
is not a Fourth Amendment violation. Once again, how is one to rec-
oncile Riley with Kyllo?
In United States v. Place, the police employed a canine to sniff the
luggage of the defendant in search of narcotics or other contraband. 336
When called upon to decide the constitutionality of the canine sniff,
the Court held that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 337
Again, the question to ask in light of Kyllo is whether a narcotics
trained dog is generally available to the public. The author of this
Note once had a dog, but it did not possess the capability to sniff out
drugs. The author also knows many families which have dogs, but
these dogs are not narcotics trained. Training a dog for such a task is
likely expensive and time consuming. It can be assumed that dogs
trained to sniff out illicit drugs are not commonly available to every
desiring member of the public. It seems that such dogs are used al-
most exclusively by law enforcement officers-not the general public.
Therefore, under Kyllo, using a canine to sniff for drugs would be an
unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But
the Supreme Court has held exactly the opposite. How legitimate
does Kyllo look in light of Place? Many commentators support the
analogy of the canine sniff to the thermal imaging scan, because they
both utilize a form of sense enhancing technology. 338 It should be
333. Riley. 488 U.S. at 447.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (implying that sufficient means are necessary to pro-
cure a helicopter).
336. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
337. Id. at 707.
338. Sarilyn E. Hardee, Why the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United
States is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV.
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noted, however, that other authors warn against the extension of the
canine sniff analogy outside the home. 339 Still, it has been suggested
that a dog sniff is actually more precise than a thermal imaging scan
because of the training the dogs receive, indicating that those sorts of
searches should be subject to even a more rigid Fourth Amendment
scrutiny than a thermal imaging scan. 340
Although expressed with a bit of sarcasm, this Note argues how
vastly Kyllo departs from controlling Fourth Amendment precedent.
If Justice Scalia, in fashioning his "general public use" test, had even
remotely considered any of the aforementioned precedent, he would
have realized how problematic his new rule actually is. To say that a
sense-enhancing device will be unconstitutional because it is not in the
general public use is completely at odds with all the pertinent cases
previously discussed. For Justice Scalia to simply ignore such argu-
ments and fashion a contradictory new rule constitutes a breach of
stare decisis.
The consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo is that
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court has been compromised. As has
been demonstrated by this Note, there were many pertinent and con-
trolling aspects of precedent that should have dictated the outcome of
the case. The Court, however, wholly neglected to apply that prece-
dent, instead fashioning a new rule. This decision will leave many
Americans wondering just what really drives Supreme Court deci-
sions. Is the Court truly bound by the decisions of the cases before it,
or are the decisions actually driven by the morals and biases of the
individual Justices?
53. 60 (2001). The commentator quotes the court in United States v. Pinson. 24 F.3d 1056. 1058
(8th Cir. 1994), which said that "j]ust as odor escapes a compartment or building and is detected
by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is
detected by the sense-enhancing thermal imager." Id.
339. Laba. supra note 258. at 1468-69. The commentator points the language of United States
v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1355 (2d Cir. 1985), when he warns that "a dog sniff 'that is not
intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person's home.' Id.
340. L. Matthew Springer. A Far Cry From Katz: Deciding the Constitutionality of Prewarrant
Thermal Imaging, 25 Oito N.U. L. REV. 593, 609 (1999). The commentator argues that because
of the training received by a drug-sniffing canine, when used properly the results of the dog sniff
will actually be more precise than a thermal imaging scan. Id. This is because the dog will only





A. Kyllo Leaves Many Open-Ended Questions
It appears as if the Kyllo majority largely ignored the Katz test as it
had been previously applied, and instead formulated a new rule.341
This new rule says that where there is warrantless use of technology
that is not available to the general public, this search will be constitu-
tionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.342 In so creating
this rule, however, the Court did not give any guidelines as to what
this term of art, "general public use," actually means. 343 This could
feasibly create a problem for law enforcement officers who are left
with no realistic interpretation as to what types of technology are con-
stitutionally acceptable and what types are constitutionally forbidden.
It begs the question as to the definitional boundaries of general public
use.344 Is general public use to be defined nationally or locally? If, for
example, the courts decide that in Chicago, a thermal imager is in the
general public use, does that mean law enforcement officers are for-
bidden from using these devices in rural Kentucky, where such tech-
nology is not in the general public use? Or, can an officer employ
such technology anywhere in the country, so long as in some areas or
states it is considered generally available? If the thermal imaging de-
vice becomes a part of the general public use, does that mean that
Kyllo will be effectively overruled, and thermal imaging will be an ac-
ceptable search under the Fourth Amendment? 345 Or, does Justice
341. One commentator has noted that it appears as if the Supreme Court may have relied on
the holding of California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), to support it's hard line rule about
"general public use." Hardee, supra note 338, at 62. The Court in Ciraolo held that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy from naked-eye aerial observation, because such flights were
routine. However, as the commentator notes, the focus in Ciraolo was on air travel and its
frequency. Id. There was no focus on the actual tool of technology, as was the case in Kyllo.
Therefore, the Kyllo Court's reliance on this decision may have been misplaced. Id.
342. Kyllo. 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
343. See id. at 2046.
344. At least one other commentator has battled with what general public use actually means:
What exactly is the definition of "general public use" ? How does one go about identi-
fying whether a device meets this definition? Does general public use imply that com-
mercial availability is enough? Does it mean that one in ten people must own a
thermal imager, or does it mean one out of ten thousand must own? Does general
public use imply that one must be able to go to the local discount store to pick up a
thermal imager? Does general public use mean one is able to obtain access to a ther-
mal imager over the Internet?
See Hardee, supra note 338, at 68-69.
345. It should be noted that at least one commentator believes these thermal imaging devices
are already widely available, a finding which, if true, would render Justice Scalia's decision moot.
Michael E. Raabe, After September 11, Where Will the U.S. Supreme Court Go?, 44 ORANGE
COUNTY LAW., Mar. 2002.
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Scalia mean that if something is at one point out of the general public
use, it will always be out of the general public use? Justice Scalia's
failure to define the term may create a whole slew of lawsuits in which
the general public use of an item will be at the center of debate.
346
B. Kyllo Could Affect the War the United States Wages
Against Terrorism
Aside from the practical considerations Kyllo raises, it is likely that
this decision will also have an impact on the contemporaneous events
of our nation. Undoubtedly, many Americans were shaken and dis-
heartened as our nation was rocked by an unprecedented terrorist at-
tack on September 11, 2001. As fear about the tragedy of the terrorist
attacks has turned to anger, more than anything we want justice for
those who have maimed our friends, our families, our neighbors, and
most of all, the soul of our nation. President George W. Bush has
committed himself and America's resources to the cause.347 However,
the problem faced by President Bush and American intelligence is
that these terrorists are not using conventional methods of communi-
cation.348 How are we to find those responsible? If the methods of
communication used by the terrorists are unorthodox, is it reasonable
to expect American intelligence to prevent future attacks by employ-
ing only the most traditional methods of surveillance? Obviously, the
clandestine attacks of September 11 were well planned and highly
guarded. This means future attacks will likely be executed in a similar
fashion. The greatest technology and intelligence will need to be em-
ployed to intercept covert correspondence to ensure that the events of
September 11 will never be repeated.
The failure of the United States to have advanced warning of the
September 11 terrorist attacks has been called a "massive intelligence
346. Not all commentators believe the Kyllo Court's failure to define general public use ren-
ders the decision a complete loss. In his article, Jonathan Todd Laba states that there are four
criteria that the Court should apply when evaluating new search technologies under the holding
of Kyllo. Laba, supra note 258, at 1476. The Court should consider: 1) the area subject to sur-
veillance: 2) the type of information revealed by the technology 3) the level of public awareness
of the technology: and 4) the nature and degree of intrusion of the device. Id. The commentator
believes that by using these criteria to consider the constitutionality of a new device, the Court
can advance police power while simultaneously preserve the values of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
347. President Bush, in his response speech to the terrorist attacks on September 11 stated:
"The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed full resources for
our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to
justice." Lines Ended by Evil: President Bush's Passionate Response to Terrorist Attacks. AM. AT
WAR. Issue 02, 2001, at 60.
348. The Pearl Harbor of Terrorism. supra note 18. at 19.
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failure. ' 349 In order to prevent a second intelligence failure, it is pos-
sible that certain forms of technology, not available for general public
use, may become a necessary and vital tool in the war on terrorism.
This nation is angry and wants an end to all terrorist threats. Presi-
dent Bush and Congressional leaders have the support of not only
American citizens, but American allies as well to take the necessary
measures to ensure September 11 will never be repeated. 350 However,
the search and seizure laws of the United States appear to be at odds
with public sentiment. On the one hand, consider the desire, the
need, and the hunger to find those responsible for the attacks and
bring them to justice, at whatever cost. On the other hand, we have a
Constitution by which we are bound that protects against unreasona-
ble search and seizure, even in the quest for justice. Will our nation's
leaders be able to fulfill the need for justice while not severely com-
promising the authority of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion? Will the Supreme Court stand up and tell President Bush and
the rest of the world that they are denying permission to implement
what could very well be life-saving technology to prevent another ter-
rorist attack, simply because it is not in the general public use? It is
true that these problems of general public use become obsolete when
a warrant is obtained from a magistrate prior to the search. However,
due to the imminent nature of the terrorist threat in this country in
which an attack could occur at any minute of the day, the immediacy
of a situation could necessitate use of such technology prior to an op-
portunity to procure a warrant. It will be interesting to see how the
Supreme Court will reconcile Kyllo when that point in time comes. 351
C. The Court Should Have Considered Public Policy When
Deciding Kyllo
The Supreme Court has never held that any right of the Constitu-
tion is utterly and completely absolute. Throughout history, the Court
has consistently held that where there is a compelling governmental
349. Retired ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former head of intelligence and research at
the State Department, We Will Ever Know: The Search is on for Leaders of Terrorists Attacks,
AM. AT WAR, Issue 02. 2001, at 67.
350. In his response speech to the terrorist attacks, President Bush stated: "America and our
friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we will stand
together to win the war against terrorism.- Lines Ended by Evil: President Bush's Passionate
Response to Terrorist Attacks, supra note 347. at 61.
351. At least one commentator believes that September 11 will have little or no impact on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Raabe, surpra note 345. He suggests that the conservative
judicial theory of "strict construction" will continue to effectuate the intent of our Founding
Fathers while simultaneously curbing "a substantial loss of civil liberties" in the wake of Septem-
ber 11. Id.
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interest at stake, the authorities may take appropriate, narrowly tai-
lored action to help remedy that problem, even at the cost of an indi-
vidual's Constitutional rights. 352 By and large, the trend seems to be
that where there has been an overwhelming safety or health concern
involved, the government has been allowed to step in and take action,
even at the cost of undermining a fundamental right.
As was previously discussed in Part II, America is plagued with a
very serious drug problem. 353 The seriousness of this problem was
noted by at least one commentator. 354 Those who are being hit the
worst are children. 355 For many young users, the drug of choice is
consistently marijuana. 356 Marijuana has the tendency to be addictive,
and it causes dependency. 357 Not only does it lead to very serious
health problems, but it also lessens the ability of abusers to function
normally. 358 A link has been found between those who commit crimes
and those who use drugs; the two are inextricably intertwined. 359
352. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that when speech has a ten-
dency to danger the citizenry of a country, the government can take measures to regulate speech,
despite the freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment): Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that concerns for health risks to a mother and her unborn child are sufficient justifica-
tion for governmental regulation of abortion, even though procreation and privacy are said to be
fundamental rights): Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. C1. 2054 (2000) (holding that where a child is not
adequately cared for, the court may intervene, even though there is a fundamental right of par-
ents to make decisions about the care and control of their kids): Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976) (holding that a state's interest in making police appear uniform and easily recognizable
overrides a person's fundamental interest to control your own appearance): and New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that a state's interest in protecting the sexual exploitation
and abuse of child actors, in avoiding a permanent scarring record, and the desire to do away
with an economic incentive to create pornography were sufficient interests to classify child por-
nography outside the protection of the First Amendment).
353. See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
354. Mindy G. Wilson. The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological Ad-
vance In the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against
Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. L.J. 891 (1994-1995). The commentator states: "To say the
manufacture, production and distribution of marijuana has become a problem in the United
States would understate and belittle the significance of the issue." Id.
355. Id.
356. Drug Enforcement Agency. Marijuana. supra note 34.
357. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Commonly Abused Drugs. supra note 33.
358. Marijuana causes frequent respiratory infections, impaired memory and learning, in-
creased heart rate, anxiety. panic attacks, confusion, slowed thinking and reaction time, and
impaired balance and coordination. Id.
359. Drug Enforcement Agency: Law Enforcement Drug Statistics. supra note 45. In major
cities from all over the country. the DEA researched the percentage of adult males testing posi-
tive for any drug at the time of arrest. The national average was sixty-four percent testing posi-
tive at the time of arrest. Id. The lowest percentage was just below fifty percent in San Antonio.
Texas. Id. The highest percentage topped out at 76.7% in Atlanta. Georgia. Id. On average.
39.9% of males arrested in the cities observed by the DEA tested positively for marijuana specif-
ically. Id. This percentage was higher than those who tested positively for any other drug stud-
ied. including cocaine, opiates, meth. and PCP. Id.
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Therefore, one could infer that addictive cravings are driving drug
abusers to commit crimes to ensure they have enough money to get
their "fix." Consequently, the crime rate is escalating.360 One could
take the extrapolation a step further, and presume that as the craze of
drug withdrawal becomes increasingly more serious as the user's hab-
its increase, hard-core abusers will turn to violent acts such as armed
robbery and burglary to get money required to pay a dealer.
The obvious question must be confronted. Considering the forego-
ing information, could anyone possibly say that drug abuse in America
does not pose a serious safety and health concern for the country? On
the contrary. It poses not only health and safety concerns for those
who choose to consume drugs, 361 but also for those who may be vic-
timized by a drug fiend on a quest for cash.
Perhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to act as it has done in the
past, and put the public interest ahead of individual rights when it
comes to Fourth Amendment drug cases. Because of the serious
health and safety concerns closely associated with the drug trade, it
would not be inappropriate for the Court to take a more proactive
role when it comes to the war on drugs. The Fourth Amendment is
supposed to protect against unreasonable search and seizure, 362 but it
says nothing about protection for illegal activities. This is, however,
exactly what the Court is doing when it invalidates a search like the
one in Kyllo. But how many more drug manufacturers is the Court
going to continue to protect in spite of the serious health and safety
concerns involved? At what point will the Court step up and say that
there is too great an interest in combating America's drug problem to
allow someone producing that much marijuana to escape on a Fourth
Amendment technicality? How serious does America's drug problem
have to get before the Court will say that something has to give, and
that for some illegal and dangerous activities, there will be no Fourth
Amendment protections? There is at least one commentator who be-
lieves that no matter how great the problem becomes, eradication ef-
forts must never interfere with Fourth Amendment protections,
because every time we do so, we erode the freedom of individual pri-
vacy interests. 363 It must be asked, however, whether we are actually
eroding our freedoms when we try to rid the nation of drug dealers,
smugglers, and manufacturers. Instead of usurping freedom, this au-
360. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
362. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
363. See Wilson, supra note 354, at 910 (stating that if limitations are not placed on the use of
technological weapons, our right to privacy may be eroded).
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thor suggests, we are actually creating it by ridding the nation of many
of those people who are at the root of many violent and personal
crimes in this country. Making the nation a safer place will, at the end
of the day, give us all the security to enjoy the freedoms we are in-
vested with, instead of walking the streets in fear.
Danny Lee Kyllo had one hundred marijuana plants growing in his
house.364 Was he planning on smoking all one hundred plants by him-
self? It is doubtful; the presumption is that he was preparing them for
distribution. By arresting Kyllo and taking him out of the drug manu-
facture or distribution scene, police authorities were protecting the
public from further harm and exploitation. In deciding this case, the
Supreme Court effectively thrust Kyllo back into that drug scene and
essentially gave him the green light to go ahead with his operations.
With one hundred marijuana plants, Kyllo could have single-handedly
impacted the drug market in his area. Agents Haas and Elliott had
anonymous tips as well as utility bills to support their suspicions about
Kyllo's marijuana activities. 365 They did not pick him at random and
take an arbitrary scan of his home. The Court effectively validated
Kyllo's right to engage in illegal activities so long as they are in an
area with a high expectation of privacy. The Court, however, should
have upheld the validity of the search on the grounds of public policy
alone. The Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect against unrea-
sonable search and seizure. It was not created by the Founding Fa-
thers as a loophole for those who get caught engaging in illegal
activities. It is high time the Court stops applying it in such a fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
On September 11, 2001, the nation was rocked by an unprecedented
terrorist attack. Although we are all driven by a plethora of emotions
in the aftermath, almost all of us share the feeling of anger. We want
justice for those who have maimed our friends, families, neighbors,
and the soul of our nation. Obviously the attacks of September 11
were highly planned and well guarded, and any future attacks will
likely be executed in a similar fashion. Therefore, the greatest of tech-
nology and intelligence will be needed to intercept covert correspon-
dence to ensure the events of September 11 will never be repeated.
The events of the day have drawn a new attention to the search and
seizure laws in the United States, which are currently at odds with
public sentiment regarding the contemporary events. Traditionally,




the Court has allowed many forms of warrantless searches and
seizures to proceed uninhibited by the judicial system. In Smith v.
Maryland, the Court upheld the warrantless installation of a pen regis-
ter device. Several years later, in Florida v. Riley, the Court upheld
the search of a backyard from a helicopter. Finally, in United States v.
Place, the Court upheld the validity of a canine sniff test at an airport.
In reaching these decisions, the Court has relied almost religiously on
the rule laid forth in Katz v. United States, which says a search will be
unreasonable if: (1) there is an actual expectation of privacy in the
area searched; and (2) that expectation is objectively reasonable.
The Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the actions of the
law enforcement officers. That is, until it heard the case of Kyllo v.
United States. In deciding Kyllo, Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, largely ignored the central holding of Katz and the manner in
which it has been applied in previous Fourth Amendment cases. In-
stead, a new rule was fashioned; if technology is not within the general
public use, a warrantless search involving that technology is presump-
tively unreasonable. This rule seems to have arrived out of thin air.
The Court failed to reconcile Kyllo with Smith, Riley, and Place, and it
neglected to apply any of the controlling precedent from these cases.
By failing to adhere to precedent, the Supreme Court has undermined
its own legitimacy, its appearance of fairness, and its predictability. It
leaves participants of the judicial system wondering about the source
of the law and the fairness of any proceedings. How impartial is a
system driven by private biases and individual morals?
At this point, the damage has been done. To that end, in the inter-
est of preventing further erosion of the confidence in the judicial sys-
tem, I have but one piece of advice for the Supreme Court as it
decides future cases: if it ain't broke, don't fix it.
Carrie L. Groskopf
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